A Non-Resolution Limbo: Better Status Quo than Settled? Georgian Territorial Integrity, Russian Security Interests, and the Status of De Facto States in the Peace Process
{"title":"A Non-Resolution Limbo: Better Status Quo than Settled? Georgian Territorial Integrity, Russian Security Interests, and the Status of De Facto States in the Peace Process","authors":"Elia Bescotti","doi":"10.5771/9783748906421-151","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"December 2019 saw the 50th round of the Geneva International Discussions over the conflict in Georgia. The last year has been particularly worrisome in view of the deterioration of the peace process over the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Events such as frequent incidents and blockages due to the borderization process have often claimed lives and create an unpleasant and dangerous situation for the people who attempt to cross the lines for any reason.1 Furthermore, despite the implementation of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms in Gali and Ergneti,2 the negotiation process has not seen any concrete positive development. President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili criticized the Geneva format, saying that it has only been able to discuss technical issues and has not been oriented towards political questions.3 However, this is hardly surprising, as the decennial deadlock over the resolution of the conflict demonstrates. As in the other unresolved conflict in the post-Soviet space, in particular those where Russia is involved as sponsor or patron state of the de facto governments in the breakaway regions, there are deep misunderstandings, or rather misrecognition of the actual role of the parties involved in the conflict. This plagues the negotiation formats, leading to the lack of a basic framework for a peaceful settlement. Georgia, like Moldova and Ukraine, insists that Russia is the other part of the conflict. Coherent with its sense of territorial integrity, Georgia has thus refused to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent actors since the 2008 war and addresses Moscow as an occupying","PeriodicalId":350982,"journal":{"name":"OSCE Yearbook 2019","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"OSCE Yearbook 2019","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748906421-151","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
December 2019 saw the 50th round of the Geneva International Discussions over the conflict in Georgia. The last year has been particularly worrisome in view of the deterioration of the peace process over the administrative boundary lines between Georgia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Events such as frequent incidents and blockages due to the borderization process have often claimed lives and create an unpleasant and dangerous situation for the people who attempt to cross the lines for any reason.1 Furthermore, despite the implementation of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms in Gali and Ergneti,2 the negotiation process has not seen any concrete positive development. President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili criticized the Geneva format, saying that it has only been able to discuss technical issues and has not been oriented towards political questions.3 However, this is hardly surprising, as the decennial deadlock over the resolution of the conflict demonstrates. As in the other unresolved conflict in the post-Soviet space, in particular those where Russia is involved as sponsor or patron state of the de facto governments in the breakaway regions, there are deep misunderstandings, or rather misrecognition of the actual role of the parties involved in the conflict. This plagues the negotiation formats, leading to the lack of a basic framework for a peaceful settlement. Georgia, like Moldova and Ukraine, insists that Russia is the other part of the conflict. Coherent with its sense of territorial integrity, Georgia has thus refused to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent actors since the 2008 war and addresses Moscow as an occupying