Leveraging eBPF to preserve user privacy for DNS, DoT, and DoH queries

Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS), a fundamental protocol that controls how users interact with the Internet, inadequately provides protection for user privacy. Recently, there have been advancements in the field of DNS privacy and security in the form of the DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) protocols. The advent of these protocols and recent advancements in large-scale data processing have drastically altered the threat model for DNS privacy. Users can no longer rely on traditional methods, and must instead take active steps to ensure their privacy. In this paper, we demonstrate how the extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) can assist users in maintaining their privacy by leveraging eBPF to provide privacy across standard DNS, DoH, and DoT communications. Further, we develop a method that allows users to enforce application-specific DNS servers. Our method provides users with control over their DNS network traffic and privacy without requiring changes to their applications while adding low overhead.