Feature Inference Attack on Shapley Values

Xinjian Luo, Yangfan Jiang, X. Xiao
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

As a solution concept in cooperative game theory, Shapley value is highly recognized in model interpretability studies and widely adopted by the leading Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) providers, such as Google, Microsoft, and IBM. However, as the Shapley value-based model interpretability methods have been thoroughly studied, few researchers consider the privacy risks incurred by Shapley values, despite that interpretability and privacy are two foundations of machine learning (ML) models. In this paper, we investigate the privacy risks of Shapley value-based model interpretability methods using feature inference attacks: reconstructing the private model inputs based on their Shapley value explanations. Specifically, we present two adversaries. The first adversary can reconstruct the private inputs by training an attack model based on an auxiliary dataset and black-box access to the model interpretability services. The second adversary, even without any background knowledge, can successfully reconstruct most of the private features by exploiting the local linear correlations between the model inputs and outputs. We perform the proposed attacks on the leading MLaaS platforms, i.e., Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, and IBM aix360. The experimental results demonstrate the vulnerability of the state-of-the-art Shapley value-based model interpretability methods used in the leading MLaaS platforms and highlight the significance and necessity of designing privacy-preserving model interpretability methods in future studies. To our best knowledge, this is also the first work that investigates the privacy risks of Shapley values.
Shapley值的特征推理攻击
Shapley值作为合作博弈论中的一个解决方案概念,在模型可解释性研究中得到高度认可,并被Google、Microsoft、IBM等领先的机器学习即服务(Machine Learning As a Service, MLaaS)提供商广泛采用。然而,由于基于Shapley值的模型可解释性方法已经被深入研究,很少有研究人员考虑到Shapley值带来的隐私风险,尽管可解释性和隐私性是机器学习模型的两个基础。在本文中,我们使用特征推理攻击研究了基于Shapley值的模型可解释性方法的隐私风险:基于Shapley值解释重建私有模型输入。具体来说,我们有两个对手。第一个攻击者可以通过基于辅助数据集和对模型可解释性服务的黑盒访问来训练攻击模型来重建私有输入。第二个对手,即使没有任何背景知识,也可以通过利用模型输入和输出之间的局部线性相关性成功地重建大多数私有特征。我们在领先的MLaaS平台上执行提议的攻击,即Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure和IBM aix360。实验结果表明,目前领先的MLaaS平台使用的基于Shapley值的模型可解释性方法存在脆弱性,并强调了在未来研究中设计保护隐私的模型可解释性方法的重要性和必要性。据我们所知,这也是第一个调查Shapley值的隐私风险的工作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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