Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption

A. Banerjee, R. Pande
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引用次数: 208

Abstract

This paper examines how increased voter ethnicization, defined as a greater preference for the party representing one's ethnic group, affects politician quality. If politics is characterized by incomplete policy commitment, then ethnicization reduces average winner quality for the pro-majority party with the opposite true for the minority party. The effect increases with greater numerical dominance of the majority (and so social homogeneity). Empirical evidence from a survey on politician corruption that we conducted in North India is remarkably consistent with our theoretical predictions.
地方政治:民族偏好与政治家腐败
本文探讨了选民族裔化(定义为对代表其族裔群体的政党的更大偏好)的增加如何影响政治家的素质。如果政治的特点是不完全的政策承诺,那么种族化降低了亲多数党的平均赢家质量,而少数党则相反。这种影响随着多数人在数量上的优势(以及社会同质性)的增加而增加。我们在北印度进行的一项关于政治家腐败的调查的经验证据与我们的理论预测非常一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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