Competition and Payment Card Interchange Fees: A Brief Note to the OECD Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz
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Abstract

One cannot be a fully conversant antitrust practitioner or academic in today’s antitrust environment without a basic, if not sophisticated, understanding of markets involving multisided platforms or so-called ecosystems—multiple horizontal and vertical relationships that center around certain platforms. And the goal is not just to understand antitrust enforcement in various jurisdictions, including those that adopt or eschew the U.S. Supreme Court’s analytical approach in AMEX, centering on market definition and the nature and strength of indirect network effects. In today’s rapidly evolving regulatory environment—where numerous jurisdictions are in the process of directly regulating big tech platforms—it is equally important to understand the underlying economics of platforms and, more broadly, the ecosystems in which many of them operate, as well as consequences of proposed or actual regulations. Payment systems are not an exception. What makes the economics of networks interesting is that each new subscriber increases the value to other subscribers, which attracts more subscribers, which increases the value to all again. This positive feedback, known as the “network effect,” creates a virtuous circle and could potentially allow a very large incumbent to corner the market, but it could also allow for significant positive, synergetic value. Hence, the strength of the network effect influences the pricing strategy of the platform as a whole, potentially creating circumstances where it is profit maximizing for the platform to heavily subsidize one side while extracting rents from the other. Besides leading to interesting economic puzzles, the network effect can lead to challenging antitrust puzzles as well. As the AMEX decision famously emphasized, if the rents collected from one side are used to subsidize the other, then it may not be procompetitive to reduce those rents under some circumstances. This is a particularly important focus for payment systems, given the great focus by several jurisdictions over the last many years on regulating one particular price of the platform, for example placing caps on interchange fees. One could think of consequences of regulation on platform pricing as a balloon full of air: if we squeeze one side (cap that the interchange fee), it will stretch and inflate the other side (inflating the other side’s price and potentially giving rise to more or new charges). Have we really thought through all implications of capping interchange fees and the overall effect on consumer welfare, efficiency and competition? What does economic theory and the empirical evidence tell us to date?
竞争和支付卡交换费:对经合组织拉丁美洲和加勒比竞争论坛的简要说明
在当今的反垄断环境中,如果没有对涉及多边平台或所谓的生态系统(以某些平台为中心的多重横向和纵向关系)的基本理解,就不可能成为完全熟悉的反垄断从业者或学者。我们的目标不仅仅是了解不同司法管辖区的反垄断执法,包括那些采用或避开美国最高法院对美国运通的分析方法的司法管辖区,该方法以市场定义和间接网络效应的性质和强度为中心。在当今快速发展的监管环境中,许多司法管辖区正在直接监管大型科技平台,了解平台的潜在经济学,更广泛地说,了解其中许多平台所处的生态系统,以及拟议或实际监管的后果,同样重要。支付系统也不例外。网络经济的有趣之处在于,每个新订户都会增加对其他订户的价值,从而吸引更多的订户,从而再次增加对所有订户的价值。这种积极的反馈被称为“网络效应”,它创造了一个良性循环,可能会让一个非常大的现任者垄断市场,但它也可能带来显著的积极的协同价值。因此,网络效应的强弱会影响平台的整体定价策略,可能会造成平台在大量补贴一方的同时从另一方榨取租金以实现利润最大化的情况。除了引发有趣的经济难题外,网络效应还可能引发具有挑战性的反垄断难题。正如美国运通的判决所强调的那样,如果从一方收取的租金被用来补贴另一方,那么在某些情况下,减少这些租金可能不利于竞争。对于支付系统来说,这是一个特别重要的焦点,因为在过去的许多年里,几个司法管辖区非常关注规范平台的一个特定价格,例如对交换费设置上限。人们可以把监管平台定价的后果想象成一个充满空气的气球:如果我们挤压一边(限制交换费),它会拉伸和膨胀另一边(膨胀另一边的价格,并可能产生更多或新的费用)。我们是否真的考虑过限制交换费的所有影响,以及对消费者福利、效率和竞争的总体影响?迄今为止,经济理论和经验证据告诉我们什么?
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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