An overview on dynamic virtual machine provisioning using truthful greedy mechanisms in clouds

A. Kirubavathi, N. Maheswari
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Abstract

Cloud providers face so many decision problems when offering Infrastructure as a Service to their customers. A major challenging problem for cloud providers is scheming efficient mechanisms for virtual machine provisioning and allocation. Those mechanisms enable the cloud providers to effectively utilize their available resources and obtain higher profits. Freshly, cloud providers have introduced auction-based models for virtual machine provisioning and allocation which allow users to submit bids for their requested virtual machines. In this paper, dynamic virtual machine provisioning and allocation problem formulated for the auction-based model considering multiple types of resources. Then truthful greedy mechanisms designed for the problem such that the cloud provider provisions virtual machines based on the requests of the winning users and determines their payments. Proposed mechanisms are truthful, that is, the users do not have incentives to influence the system by lying about their requested bundles of virtual machine instances and their valuations. Proposed mechanisms will achieve promising results in terms of revenue for the cloud provider.
在云中使用真实贪婪机制的动态虚拟机供应概述
云提供商在向客户提供基础设施即服务时面临许多决策问题。云提供商面临的一个主要挑战是为虚拟机的供应和分配设计有效的机制。这些机制使云提供商能够有效地利用其可用资源并获得更高的利润。最近,云提供商为虚拟机配置和分配引入了基于拍卖的模型,允许用户为他们请求的虚拟机提交投标。本文针对考虑多种资源类型的基于拍卖的虚拟机模型,提出了虚拟机的动态配置与分配问题。然后针对该问题设计了真实贪婪机制,使得云提供商根据获胜用户的请求提供虚拟机并确定其支付。所提议的机制是真实的,也就是说,用户没有动机通过谎报他们请求的虚拟机实例包及其估值来影响系统。拟议的机制将在云提供商的收入方面取得可喜的成果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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