国有股与政府董事对银行业绩的影响 The Effect of State Ownership and Government-Affiliated Board Members on the Performance of Banks in China

Abstract

以2004年到2013年30家银行的数据作为样本，分析国有股和政府董事对银行资产收益率、不良贷款率和收入费用率的影响。结果显示，国有股比例越高，或政府董事比例越高，对经营业绩负面的影响越明显。这与政府重视社会利益和政治利益的假说一致。过去十年中政府介入对不良贷款率所代表的银行稳健性明显地产生了不利影响。减少政府干预，发挥市场机制的调节作用有利于建设稳健的银行体系。 Using the data of 30 Chinese banks during the period of 2004–2013 as a sample, we analyze the im-pacts of state ownership and government-affiliated board members on bank’s return on assets, non-performed loan rates and cost-income rates. We find that the higher state-owned stock rate and more government-affiliated members make bank performance worse. The result is consistent with the hypotheses of “development view” or “politic view” of government. In the past decade govern-ment’s intervention made negative effect on banks’ soundness measured by NPL rate. The findings suggest that the government has to give up the intervention in order for a more effective and sound banking system.