Rules of Engagement

Rebecca Tushnet
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Abstract

In 1997, millionaire John Lattanzio sued model Ines Misan for the return of half a million dollars in gifts he had given her, allegedly in the hope that she would marry him. The scandal died down when they settled, Misan keeping gifts worth $210,000 and returning an engagement ring worth $290,000.' The settlement probably replicated what a court would have done,2 which raises the question: Why does the law treat engagement rings differently from other gifts? The answer is rooted in a history in which courts generally entertained litigation over broken engagements. As legislatures slowly abolished actions for breach of promise to marry in the early and middle decades of this century, on the grounds that such actions were inconsistent with modem understandings of love and marriage, one potential fact pattern for successful plaintiffs emerged: the case in which a man sues a woman for the return of his engagement gifts. The history and logic of this body of law-the rules of engagementinvite examination. Most discussions of the role of the law in regulating marital relations assume that the law begins its control at the time of the marriage ceremony. The state prescribes who can marry, and how; the state also determines the terms upon which marriages can be dissolved. The assumption is that the law's effects on premarital behavior are indirect consequences of this post-ceremonial regulation. Most analyses of family law do not recognize the direct regulation of premarital behavior as a part of the no-fault regime that has grown up around marriage. This failure to examine premarital law has prevented commentators from evaluating the ideas about property embedded in the current premarital legal regime, particularly the gendered consequences of that regime. It has also encouraged legal analysts to consider questions of the definition of property and the nature of promises to marry as settled and irrelevant to other areas of the law. This inattention is a mistake. It should be no surprise that
交战规则
1997年,百万富翁约翰·拉坦齐奥(John Lattanzio)起诉模特伊内斯·米桑(Ines Misan),要求归还他送给她的50万美元礼物,据称是希望她嫁给他。两人和解后丑闻平息,米桑留下了价值21万美元的礼物,并归还了价值29万美元的订婚戒指。”这一和解可能复制了法院会做的事情,这就提出了一个问题:为什么法律对订婚戒指和其他礼物区别对待?这个问题的答案源于一段历史,在那段历史中,法院通常受理有关违约的诉讼。在本世纪的前几十年和中期,立法机构逐渐废除了违反婚姻承诺的诉讼,理由是这种行为与现代对爱情和婚姻的理解不一致,一种成功原告的潜在事实模式出现了:一名男子起诉一名女子,要求归还他的订婚礼物。这一法律体系——交战规则——的历史和逻辑值得研究。大多数关于法律在调节婚姻关系中的作用的讨论都假设法律在结婚仪式时开始控制。国家规定谁可以结婚,怎样结婚;国家还决定婚姻可以解除的条件。假设是,法律对婚前行为的影响是这种后仪式规定的间接后果。大多数对家庭法的分析都不承认对婚前行为的直接监管是围绕婚姻而形成的无过错制度的一部分。由于没有对婚前法律进行审查,评论人士无法评估当前婚前法律制度中关于财产的观念,特别是该制度的性别后果。它还鼓励法律分析人士将财产的定义和婚姻承诺的性质等问题视为已确定的、与法律其他领域无关的问题。这种疏忽是一个错误。这不足为奇
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