{"title":"Does Obligation Require Weak or Strong Alternatives?","authors":"Ishtiyaque Haji","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190050856.003.0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Weak alternatives are alternatives one can have even if determinism is true. Strong alternatives are unavailable to anyone if determinism is true. Chapter 6 pursues a strategy to establish that the alternatives obligation requires are weak. This strategy is negative, consisting in showing that various considerations for the opposed position—obligation requires strong alternatives—are not cogent. The chapter also assesses a line of reasoning for the view that one can circumvent entirely the thorny issue of whether responsibility or obligation, if either requires alternatives, requires strong or weak alternatives. The recommendation is that we should focus instead on whether determinism undermines ability or opportunity to do otherwise. It is argued that attempting to skirt the thorny issue in this way is problematic.","PeriodicalId":436722,"journal":{"name":"The Obligation Dilemma","volume":"451 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Obligation Dilemma","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190050856.003.0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Weak alternatives are alternatives one can have even if determinism is true. Strong alternatives are unavailable to anyone if determinism is true. Chapter 6 pursues a strategy to establish that the alternatives obligation requires are weak. This strategy is negative, consisting in showing that various considerations for the opposed position—obligation requires strong alternatives—are not cogent. The chapter also assesses a line of reasoning for the view that one can circumvent entirely the thorny issue of whether responsibility or obligation, if either requires alternatives, requires strong or weak alternatives. The recommendation is that we should focus instead on whether determinism undermines ability or opportunity to do otherwise. It is argued that attempting to skirt the thorny issue in this way is problematic.