{"title":"Foreign Affairs and War","authors":"M. W. McConnell","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv11hprfg.16","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter reviews the king's powers of peace and war as of 1787, which included the power to make war, declare war, command troops and the Navy during war, summon and employ the militia, and erect forts and other military installations. It recalls Charles Pinckney, who warned that the Convention was creating an elective monarchy. It also discusses how the Convention vested the bulk of the war and foreign affairs powers in Congress and the Senate, except the executive, and how the presidency gained most of its foreign affairs authority only toward the end of the Convention. The chapter cites the king's prerogative power over foreign affairs that was absolute, at least in theory, under the post-1688 settlement. It talks about the Confederation Congress that typically issued detailed instructions to its envoys regarding what positions to take on behalf of the United States, suggesting that the power to send ambassadors included the power to instruct them.","PeriodicalId":252767,"journal":{"name":"The President Who Would Not Be King","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The President Who Would Not Be King","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11hprfg.16","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter reviews the king's powers of peace and war as of 1787, which included the power to make war, declare war, command troops and the Navy during war, summon and employ the militia, and erect forts and other military installations. It recalls Charles Pinckney, who warned that the Convention was creating an elective monarchy. It also discusses how the Convention vested the bulk of the war and foreign affairs powers in Congress and the Senate, except the executive, and how the presidency gained most of its foreign affairs authority only toward the end of the Convention. The chapter cites the king's prerogative power over foreign affairs that was absolute, at least in theory, under the post-1688 settlement. It talks about the Confederation Congress that typically issued detailed instructions to its envoys regarding what positions to take on behalf of the United States, suggesting that the power to send ambassadors included the power to instruct them.