ChatterHub: Privacy Invasion via Smart Home Hub

Omid Setayeshfar, Karthika Subramani, Xingzi Yuan, Raunak Dey, Dezhi Hong, K. H. Lee, In Kee Kim
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Smart-home devices promise to make users’ lives more convenient. However, at the same time, such devices increase the possibility of breaching users’ privacy as they are tightly connected to the users’ daily lives and activities. To address privacy invasion through smart-home devices, we present ChatterHub. This novel approach accurately identifies smart-home devices’ activities with minimal monitoring of encrypted traffic in the home network. ChatterHub targets devices that can only connect to the Internet through a centralized smart-home hub (e.g., Samsung SmartThings) using Zigbee or Z-wave. Specifically, ChatterHub passively eavesdrops on encrypted network traffic from the hub and leverages machine learning techniques to classify events and states of smart-home devices. Using ChatterHub, an adversary can identify smart-home devices’ specific activities without prior knowledge of the target smart home (e.g., list of deployed devices, types of communication protocols). We evaluated the accuracy and efficiency of ChatterHub in three real-world smart-home environments, and the evaluation results show that an attacker can successfully disclose smart-home devices’ behaviors with over 88% F1 score. We further demonstrate that ChatterHub successfully recognizes privacy-sensitive activities, including open and close of a smart door lock and turn on and off of smart LED. Additionally, to mitigate the threats posed by ChatterHub, we introduce two approaches, packet padding and random sequence injection. These mitigation approaches can effectively prevent threats from ChatterHub with only 9.2MB of additional network traffic per day.
ChatterHub:通过智能家居中心侵犯隐私
智能家居设备承诺让用户的生活更方便。但与此同时,这些设备与用户的日常生活和活动紧密相连,增加了侵犯用户隐私的可能性。为了解决通过智能家居设备侵犯隐私的问题,我们提出了ChatterHub。这种新颖的方法可以准确地识别智能家居设备的活动,同时对家庭网络中的加密流量进行最小的监控。ChatterHub的目标设备只能通过使用Zigbee或Z-wave的集中式智能家居集线器(例如三星SmartThings)连接到互联网。具体来说,ChatterHub被动窃听来自集线器的加密网络流量,并利用机器学习技术对智能家居设备的事件和状态进行分类。使用ChatterHub,攻击者可以识别智能家居设备的特定活动,而无需事先了解目标智能家居(例如,部署的设备列表,通信协议类型)。我们在三个真实的智能家居环境中对ChatterHub的准确性和效率进行了评估,评估结果表明攻击者可以成功地泄露智能家居设备的行为,F1得分超过88%。我们进一步证明,ChatterHub成功识别隐私敏感活动,包括打开和关闭智能门锁以及打开和关闭智能LED。此外,为了减轻ChatterHub带来的威胁,我们引入了两种方法,数据包填充和随机序列注入。这些缓解方法可以有效地防止来自ChatterHub的威胁,每天仅需增加9.2MB的网络流量。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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