Moving-Target Defense for Detecting Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids via a Modified Sensor Measurements Expression

Yu Jian
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Abstract

This paper proposes a modified sensor measurement expression for moving target defense (MTD) method to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks(CCPAs). As a new type of attack, CCPAs are considerably harmful. Through elaborately designing a coordinated cyber-attack, the negative effects of a physical attack on sensor measurements are masked and can bypass bad data detector(BDD). MTD strategy can actively perturb transmission lines’ reactances, which makes the knowledge of a power grid grasped by attackers invalid. In the paper, first, based on undetectable CCPAs production principle before MTD activation, the undetectable CCPAs’ production mechanism is analyzed after MTD activation; and then a modified sensor measurement expression for detecting CCPAs is provided after MTD activation. Extensive simulations implemented on IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the simplicity and efficiency of the approach.
基于改进传感器测量表达式的电网网络物理协同攻击移动目标防御
提出了一种改进的传感器测量表达式,用于移动目标防御(MTD)方法检测协同网络物理攻击(ccpa)。ccpa作为一种新型的攻击方式,具有相当大的危害性。通过精心设计协调的网络攻击,可以掩盖物理攻击对传感器测量的负面影响,并可以绕过坏数据检测器(BDD)。MTD策略可以对输电线路的电抗进行主动扰动,使得攻击者掌握的电网知识失效。本文首先根据MTD激活前ccpa不可检测的产生原理,分析了MTD激活后ccpa不可检测的产生机理;然后给出MTD激活后检测ccpa的改进传感器测量表达式。在IEEE 14总线、IEEE 30总线和IEEE 118总线系统上进行的大量仿真验证了该方法的简单性和有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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