{"title":"Moving-Target Defense for Detecting Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids via a Modified Sensor Measurements Expression","authors":"Yu Jian","doi":"10.1145/3584714.3589127","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a modified sensor measurement expression for moving target defense (MTD) method to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks(CCPAs). As a new type of attack, CCPAs are considerably harmful. Through elaborately designing a coordinated cyber-attack, the negative effects of a physical attack on sensor measurements are masked and can bypass bad data detector(BDD). MTD strategy can actively perturb transmission lines’ reactances, which makes the knowledge of a power grid grasped by attackers invalid. In the paper, first, based on undetectable CCPAs production principle before MTD activation, the undetectable CCPAs’ production mechanism is analyzed after MTD activation; and then a modified sensor measurement expression for detecting CCPAs is provided after MTD activation. Extensive simulations implemented on IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the simplicity and efficiency of the approach.","PeriodicalId":112952,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on Cyber Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3584714.3589127","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper proposes a modified sensor measurement expression for moving target defense (MTD) method to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks(CCPAs). As a new type of attack, CCPAs are considerably harmful. Through elaborately designing a coordinated cyber-attack, the negative effects of a physical attack on sensor measurements are masked and can bypass bad data detector(BDD). MTD strategy can actively perturb transmission lines’ reactances, which makes the knowledge of a power grid grasped by attackers invalid. In the paper, first, based on undetectable CCPAs production principle before MTD activation, the undetectable CCPAs’ production mechanism is analyzed after MTD activation; and then a modified sensor measurement expression for detecting CCPAs is provided after MTD activation. Extensive simulations implemented on IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems verify the simplicity and efficiency of the approach.