{"title":"The Concept of 'Office of Profit' in India","authors":"S. Swain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2181796","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In democratic systems across the world, there are constitutional provisions and legislations, putting a certain bar on elected representatives from holding ‘Office of Profit’. The inherent idea is to ensure that personal and pecuniary interests will not come in the way of the objective and effective discharge by the legislators of their onerous responsibilities. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that in democratic politics, parliamentarians and legislators, besides their varied role as elected representatives, are also expected to aid and advise public institutions and trusts so as to help these institutions function efficiently for the welfare and well-being of the people and the country at large. The rationale and the raison d’etre behind the concept of ‘Office of Profit’ is that the holder of a public office should not get influenced by any consideration whatsoever while discharging his various responsibilities. An elected representative is the repository of the confidence and trust of his constituents. That being so it is imperative that they do not corrode public confidence by any act of omission or commission while performing their varied roles. It is but natural, therefore, that members are expected to act according to the highest standards of probity, accountability, honesty and integrity in the exercise of their public duties.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2181796","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In democratic systems across the world, there are constitutional provisions and legislations, putting a certain bar on elected representatives from holding ‘Office of Profit’. The inherent idea is to ensure that personal and pecuniary interests will not come in the way of the objective and effective discharge by the legislators of their onerous responsibilities. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that in democratic politics, parliamentarians and legislators, besides their varied role as elected representatives, are also expected to aid and advise public institutions and trusts so as to help these institutions function efficiently for the welfare and well-being of the people and the country at large. The rationale and the raison d’etre behind the concept of ‘Office of Profit’ is that the holder of a public office should not get influenced by any consideration whatsoever while discharging his various responsibilities. An elected representative is the repository of the confidence and trust of his constituents. That being so it is imperative that they do not corrode public confidence by any act of omission or commission while performing their varied roles. It is but natural, therefore, that members are expected to act according to the highest standards of probity, accountability, honesty and integrity in the exercise of their public duties.