The Impact of Whistleblowing Awards Programs on Corporate Governance

Janet Austin, S. Lombard
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Since the introduction of a whistle-blower awards program by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010, securities regulators in other countries, including Canada, have adopted, or are considering adopting, similar programs. For example, in 2016, the Ontario Securities Commission adopted its own whistle-blower award program. Although the primary main reason for these programs is to encourage the reporting of securities violations to the regulator, they could also have an impact on corporate governance. This is because the implementation of such a program may prod companies to design, and then instigate, a more effective internal whistle-blowing system. A truly successful internal whistle-blowing system can enable a company to detect and correct potential wrongdoing before it causes significant harm. This article closely examines this connection between whistle-blowing award programs, companies’ compliance and risk management systems, and how a whistle-blowing award program might well result in more effective internal whistle-blowing systems without the need for a regulator to resort to the imposition of prescriptive rules. As such, this article reflects upon how whistle-blower award programs fit within new governance regulatory theory that challenges traditional “command-and-control-type”regulation in favour of an outcome-driven approach.
举报人奖励计划对公司治理的影响
自2010年美国证券交易委员会(sec)推出举报人奖励计划以来,包括加拿大在内的其他国家的证券监管机构已经或正在考虑采用类似的计划。例如,2016年,安大略省证券委员会(Ontario Securities Commission)采用了自己的举报人奖励计划。虽然这些计划的主要原因是鼓励向监管机构报告证券违规行为,但它们也可能对公司治理产生影响。这是因为实施这样的计划可能会促使公司设计,然后煽动,一个更有效的内部举报制度。一个真正成功的内部举报系统可以使公司在潜在的不法行为造成重大损害之前发现并纠正。本文仔细研究了举报人奖励计划、公司合规和风险管理系统之间的联系,以及举报人奖励计划如何在不需要监管机构诉诸强制规定的情况下,很好地产生更有效的内部举报人制度。因此,本文反映了举报人奖励计划如何适应新的治理监管理论,该理论挑战了传统的“命令和控制型”监管,支持结果驱动的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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