The Use and Abuse of Labor's Capital

David H. Webber
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

The recent financial crisis has jeopardized the retirement savings of twenty-seven million Americans who depend on public pension funds, leading to cuts in benefits, increased employee contributions, job losses, and the rollback of legal rights like collective bargaining. This Article examines ways in which public pension funds invest against the economic interests of their own participants and beneficiaries, and the legal implications of these investments. In particular, the Article focuses on the use of public pensions to fund privatization of public employee jobs. Under the ascendant — and flawed — interpretation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, public pension trustees owe their allegiance to the fund itself, rather than to the fund’s participants and beneficiaries, notwithstanding the fact that the duty of loyalty commands trustees to invest “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” according to ERISA and similar state pension codes. I argue that this “fund-first” view distorts the duty of loyalty and turns the role of trustee on its head, leading to investments that undermine, rather than enhance, the economic interests of public employees. I turn to ERISA, trust law, agency law, and corporate law to argue that public pension trustees should consider the impact of the funds’ investments on the jobs and job security of the funds’ participants and beneficiaries, where relevant. I also adduce evidence that these controversial investments are widespread. I propose that public pension funds be governed by a “member-first” view of fiduciary duty focused on the economic interests of public employees in their retirement funds, which go beyond maximizing return to the funds. I argue that this view is more faithful to the original purpose of the duty of loyalty than is the fund-first view. I suggest ways to implement the member-first view, discuss potential extensions beyond the jobs impact of investments, and assess the proposed reform’s practical effects.
劳动资本的使用与滥用
最近的金融危机危及了2700万依赖公共养老基金的美国人的退休储蓄,导致福利削减、雇员缴费增加、失业以及集体谈判等合法权利的倒退。本文考察了公共养老基金投资违背其参与者和受益人经济利益的方式,以及这些投资的法律含义。特别是,该条侧重于利用公共养老金为公共雇员工作的私有化提供资金。根据对忠诚信托义务的一种盛行且有缺陷的解释,尽管根据ERISA和类似的州养老金法规,忠诚义务要求受托人“完全为参与者和受益人的利益”进行投资,但公共养老金受托人应忠于基金本身,而不是基金的参与者和受益人。我认为,这种“基金优先”的观点扭曲了忠诚的义务,颠倒了受托人的角色,导致了损害(而不是增强)公职人员经济利益的投资。我转向ERISA,信托法,代理法和公司法来论证公共养老金受托人应该考虑基金投资对基金参与者和受益人的工作和工作保障的影响,如果相关的话。我还引用证据表明,这些有争议的投资是普遍存在的。我建议,公共养老基金应以“成员优先”的信义义务观点来管理,重点关注公务员在其退休基金中的经济利益,而不仅仅是最大化基金回报。我认为,这种观点比基金优先的观点更忠实于忠诚义务的最初目的。我提出了实施成员优先观点的方法,讨论了投资对就业影响之外的潜在延伸,并评估了拟议改革的实际效果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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