Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin

Avishalom Tor, William J. Rinner
{"title":"Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason after Leegin","authors":"Avishalom Tor, William J. Rinner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1522948","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which replaced the longstanding per-se rule against resale price maintenance (RPM) with a rule of reason approach, has resurrected the debate over RPM. Legal and economic proponents of this practice again point to its potential procompetitive benefits, while RPM detractors emphasize its possible anticompetitive consequences. Despite their disagreements regarding the overall RPM evaluation, however, scholars, the Court, and the limited empirical data appear near-unanimous in agreeing that such arrangements can either increase or decrease efficiency. Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly revolves around theoretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and significance of RPM's pro- versus anti-competitive manifestations. Importantly, however, all of these theories also assume – like traditional antitrust scholarship more generally – that manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ only profit-maximizing arrangements. In contrast, a behavioral analysis suggests that real-world, boundedly-rational manufacturers are prone to overuse RPM, at times harming consumers. The available evidence reveals this excessive reliance on RPM slowly diminishes over time, as biased manufacturers are taught or disciplined by the market. The slow demise of this practice, however, may entail significant efficiency losses over many years. Yet because RPM will sometimes be procompetitive, Leegin's rejection of its per-se condemnation in favor of a rule of reason analysis is still justified. The present analysis therefore not only offers a novel account of resale price maintenance, but also shows how boundedly rational RPM challenges the various post-Leegin approaches developed by some courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars on both sides of the RPM debate. We close by outlining our alternative, behaviorally informed, structured rule of reason inquiry for this restraint.","PeriodicalId":191231,"journal":{"name":"Law & Psychology eJournal","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Psychology eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1522948","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., which replaced the longstanding per-se rule against resale price maintenance (RPM) with a rule of reason approach, has resurrected the debate over RPM. Legal and economic proponents of this practice again point to its potential procompetitive benefits, while RPM detractors emphasize its possible anticompetitive consequences. Despite their disagreements regarding the overall RPM evaluation, however, scholars, the Court, and the limited empirical data appear near-unanimous in agreeing that such arrangements can either increase or decrease efficiency. Consequently, the RPM debate predominantly revolves around theoretical assertions regarding the likely frequency and significance of RPM's pro- versus anti-competitive manifestations. Importantly, however, all of these theories also assume – like traditional antitrust scholarship more generally – that manufacturers are strictly rational actors, who employ only profit-maximizing arrangements. In contrast, a behavioral analysis suggests that real-world, boundedly-rational manufacturers are prone to overuse RPM, at times harming consumers. The available evidence reveals this excessive reliance on RPM slowly diminishes over time, as biased manufacturers are taught or disciplined by the market. The slow demise of this practice, however, may entail significant efficiency losses over many years. Yet because RPM will sometimes be procompetitive, Leegin's rejection of its per-se condemnation in favor of a rule of reason analysis is still justified. The present analysis therefore not only offers a novel account of resale price maintenance, but also shows how boundedly rational RPM challenges the various post-Leegin approaches developed by some courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars on both sides of the RPM debate. We close by outlining our alternative, behaviorally informed, structured rule of reason inquiry for this restraint.
行为反垄断:Leegin之后理性规则的新途径
最高法院最近在Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.一案中的裁决,用理性原则取代了长期以来反对转售价格维持(RPM)的本身规则,重新引发了关于RPM的辩论。这种做法的法律和经济支持者再次指出其潜在的促进竞争的好处,而RPM的批评者则强调其可能的反竞争后果。然而,尽管学者、法院和有限的经验数据在总体RPM评估方面存在分歧,但他们似乎一致认为,这种安排既可以提高效率,也可以降低效率。因此,RPM辩论主要围绕着关于RPM的亲与反竞争表现的可能频率和意义的理论断言。然而,重要的是,所有这些理论也都假定——就像传统的反垄断学术一样——制造商是严格的理性行为者,他们只采用利润最大化的安排。相反,一项行为分析表明,现实世界中,有限理性的制造商倾向于过度使用RPM,有时会伤害消费者。现有证据表明,随着时间的推移,这种对RPM的过度依赖会慢慢减少,因为有偏见的制造商会受到市场的教导或约束。然而,这种做法的缓慢消亡可能会导致多年来的重大效率损失。然而,由于RPM有时是有利于竞争的,Leegin拒绝其本身的谴责而支持理性分析的规则仍然是合理的。因此,当前的分析不仅提供了转售价格维持的新描述,而且还显示了有限理性RPM如何挑战由RPM辩论双方的一些法院,执法机构和学者开发的各种后leegin方法。最后,我们概述了我们对这种约束的另一种选择,行为信息,结构化的理性规则调查。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信