Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities in U.S. and U.K. Business Entities

Christopher M. Bruner
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This chapter explores the extent of contractual freedom to opt out of fiduciary duties and liabilities in U.S. and U.K. business entities, including the U.S. corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, and limited liability company, and the U.K. limited company, general partnership, limited partnership, and limited liability partnership. Discernible commonalities emerge from this comparative analysis. Notably, corporate law readily permits reducing liability exposure for breaches of duty in each jurisdiction, yet provides only quite limited capacity to carve back at the substance of the duties themselves. Meanwhile, unincorporated entities in each jurisdiction offer substantially greater latitude to limit the duties themselves, in some cases resulting in purely contractual business relationships. Yet substantial differences are also apparent. U.S. corporate law permits greater insulation from liability exposure, and U.S. unincorporated entities generally provide clearer and more extensive latitude to eliminate default duties of loyalty and care outright (particularly in Delaware). One cannot comprehensively declare that U.S. law universally deviates further from the "fiduciary" governance paradigm, however, because the U.K. limited liability partnership has gone further by providing an entity form in which no such general default duties apply at all. The analysis raises some complex comparative questions, and the chapter closes with brief reflections on why such trends, commonalities, and divergences may have arisen.
选择退出美国和英国商业实体的受托责任和责任
本章探讨了美国和英国商业实体(包括美国公司、普通合伙企业、有限合伙企业、有限责任合伙企业和有限责任公司)以及英国有限公司、普通合伙企业、有限合伙企业和有限责任合伙企业)中选择退出信托义务和责任的合同自由程度。从这种比较分析中可以看出明显的共性。值得注意的是,公司法很容易允许在每个司法管辖区减少违反义务的责任风险,但只提供相当有限的能力来追溯责任本身的实质。与此同时,每个司法管辖区的非法人实体提供了更大的自由来限制责任本身,在某些情况下导致纯粹的合同商业关系。然而,实质性的差异也是显而易见的。美国公司法允许更大程度的责任隔离,美国非法人实体通常提供更明确和更广泛的自由,以彻底消除忠诚和照顾的违约义务(特别是在特拉华州)。然而,我们不能全面地宣称美国法律普遍地进一步偏离了“信托”治理范式,因为英国有限责任合伙企业已经更进一步,提供了一种根本不适用这种一般违约义务的实体形式。这一分析提出了一些复杂的比较问题,本章最后简要反思了为什么会出现这样的趋势、共性和分歧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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