Optimal Recycling Strategies with the Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanism

G. Cai, Jianbin Li, Qifei Wang, Stuart X. Zhu
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Recycling and remanufacturing have emerged as a key instrument in pursuit of environment-friendly sustainability in the society. Using game-theoretic approaches, this article investigates the optimal pricing and remanufacturing strategies of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in recycling used products by either itself or a third-party (TP) under the name-your-own-price (NYOP) mechanism. Our analysis demonstrates that either the OEM recycling or the TP recycling can outperform the other in terms of firms’ profits, consumer utility, and environmental impact. However, there exists a conflicting zone, in which the TP recycling is more profitable for the firms, but the OEM recycling leads to more consumer utility and less environmental impact. Comparing the NYOP mechanism to the list-price mechanism reveals that the OEM conditionally prefers the NYOP mechanism to the list-price mechanism; however, the OEM and the TP may encounter another preference confliction, in which the OEM prefers the NYOP whereas the TP prefers the list-price. The firms’ preference for NYOP dwindles as the used-product seller’s belief of the NYOP reserve price grows. Enabling haggling in NYOP does not always enhance the firms’ profits, consumer utility, and environment-friendly level.
定价机制下的最优回收策略
回收和再制造已经成为社会追求环境友好型可持续发展的重要手段。本文运用博弈论方法,研究了原始设备制造商(OEM)在自行定价(NYOP)机制下自行或第三方回收废旧产品时的最优定价和再制造策略。我们的分析表明,无论是OEM回收还是TP回收,在企业利润、消费者效用和环境影响方面都优于对方。然而,存在一个冲突区,在这个冲突区中,TP回收对企业来说更有利可图,但OEM回收导致更多的消费者效用和更小的环境影响。对比NYOP机制和标价机制,OEM有条件地倾向于NYOP机制而不是标价机制;然而,OEM和TP可能会遇到另一个偏好冲突,其中OEM更喜欢NYOP,而TP更喜欢标价。公司对NYOP的偏好随着二手产品卖家对NYOP保留价格的信念的增加而减少。在NYOP中允许讨价还价并不一定能提高企业利润、消费者效用和环境友好水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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