Fascism and Monopoly

D. Crane
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The recent revival of political interest in antitrust has resurfaced a longstanding debate about the role of industrial concentration and monopoly in enabling Hitler’s rise to power and the Third Reich’s wars of aggression. Proponents of stronger antitrust enforcement argue that monopolies and cartels brought the Nazis to power and warn that rising concentration in the American economy could similarly threaten democracy. Skeptics demur, observing that German big business largely opposed Hitler during the crucial years of his ascent. Drawing on business histories and archival material from the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Decartelization Unit, this Article assesses the historical record on the role of industrial concentration in facilitating Nazism. It finds compelling evidence that, while German big business principally did not support Hitler before he won the Chancellorship in 1933, the extreme concentration of market power during the Weimar period enabled Hitler to seize and consolidate totalitarian power through a variety of mechanisms. Hence, the German experience with Nazism lends support to the idea that extreme concentration of economic power enables extreme concentration of political power. However, most of the conduct that created the radical economic concentration of the Weimar period would be unlawful under contemporary antitrust principles, which casts doubt on claims that a significant shift in antitrust enforcement is necessary to forestall anti-democratic forces.
法西斯主义和大富翁
最近对反托拉斯的政治兴趣重新抬头,重新引发了一个长期存在的争论,即工业集中和垄断在希特勒掌权和第三帝国发动侵略战争中所起的作用。支持加强反垄断执法的人认为,垄断和卡特尔让纳粹上台,并警告说,美国经济中日益集中的企业,可能同样会威胁到民主。怀疑论者对此表示异议,他们指出,在希特勒崛起的关键时期,德国大企业基本上是反对他的。借鉴商业历史和美国军事政府办公室去卡特尔部门的档案材料,本文评估了工业集中在促进纳粹主义中的作用的历史记录。书中发现了令人信服的证据,尽管德国大企业在1933年赢得总理职位之前基本上不支持希特勒,但魏玛时期市场力量的极度集中使希特勒能够通过各种机制夺取和巩固极权主义权力。因此,德国在纳粹主义方面的经验支持了这样一种观点,即经济权力的极度集中会导致政治权力的极度集中。然而,在当代反垄断原则下,造成魏玛时期激进的经济集中的大多数行为都是非法的,这使人们怀疑反垄断执法的重大转变是防止反民主力量的必要条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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