Efficiency, Welfare and Ownership of Private Information

Qihong Liu, Konstantinos Serfes
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Abstract

Unrestricted flows of information usually improve efficiency. The recent growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools have paved the road for the collection and analysis of a vast amount of data about consumers. Firms who possess such information can target individual consumers (or certain groups of consumers) more effectively. We investigate whether consumers can claim some of the value of their own private information, while at the same time efficient flows of information are guaranteed. We address this question in a principal-agent adverse selection model. Prior to the contracting stage, the agent (consumer) chooses how much (precision) of his private information to sell to the principal. This gives rise to a signaling game that precedes the adverse selection stage. We show that there exists a pooling efficient equilibrium, where both agent types sell all their information to the principal.
效率、福利与私人信息所有权
不受限制的信息流动通常会提高效率。作为通信和商业媒介的互联网最近的发展,加上复杂软件工具的发展,为收集和分析大量消费者数据铺平了道路。拥有这些信息的公司可以更有效地瞄准个别消费者(或某些消费者群体)。我们研究消费者是否可以主张他们自己的私人信息的一些价值,同时保证信息的有效流动。我们在一个委托代理逆向选择模型中解决了这个问题。在签约阶段之前,代理人(消费者)选择向委托人出售多少(精确)他的私人信息。这就产生了逆向选择阶段之前的信号博弈。我们证明了存在一个池化有效均衡,其中两种代理类型都将其所有信息出售给委托人。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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