Neuroethics

Abstract

Neuroethics, located at the interface of conceptual and empirical dimensions, carries major implications for psychiatry, such as the neuroscientific basis of ethical concepts as moral agency. Drawing on data in neuroscience, this chapter highlights issues central to psychiatric ethics. First, it addresses a reductionistic model of the brain, often conceived as purely neuronal, and then it discusses empirical data suggesting that the brain’s activity is strongly aligned to its respective social (e.g., relation to others) and ecological (e.g., relation to the environment and nature) contexts; this implies a relational rather than reductionist model. Second, it suggests that self (e.g., the experience or sense of a self) and personhood (e.g., the person as existent independent of experience) must also be understood in such a social and ecological and, therefore, relational and spatio-temporal sense. Ethical concepts like agency, therefore, cannot be limited solely to the person and brain, but must rather be understood in a relational and neuro-ecological/social way. Third, it discusses deep brain stimulation as a treatment that promotes enhancement. In sum, this chapter presents findings in neuroscience that carry major implications for our view of brain, mental features, psychiatric disorders, and ethical issues like agency, responsibility, and enhancement.