Regression Analysis of Executive Shareholding and Corporate Earnings Management

Yuanyuan Wang
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Abstract

The distortion of financial data of Chinese listed companies emerges is constantly emerging, for example earnings management through various means such as whitewashing financial reports, which is bound to have a negative impact on China's economic development. This paper uses regression analysis to examine the relationship between the company's executive shareholding and earnings management level. Under certain conditions, the company's executive shareholding and earnings management level have a negative correlation. The larger the company's executive shareholding, the more effective the governance mechanism, and the higher the efficiency of supervision and incentives, the more it will help the management to operate the company with the goal of maximizing shareholders' interests and reduce earnings management.
高管持股与公司盈余管理的回归分析
中国上市公司财务数据失真现象不断出现,例如通过粉饰财务报告等各种手段进行盈余管理,这势必会对中国经济发展产生负面影响。本文采用回归分析的方法考察了公司高管持股比例与盈余管理水平之间的关系。在一定条件下,公司高管持股与盈余管理水平呈负相关关系。公司高管持股比例越大,公司治理机制越有效,监督激励效率越高,越有利于管理层以股东利益最大化为目标经营公司,减少盈余管理。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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