{"title":"The Metric Matters: The Art of Measuring Trust in Electronics","authors":"Jonathan Cruz, P. Mishra, S. Bhunia","doi":"10.1145/3316781.3323488","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Electronic hardware trust is an emerging concern for all stakeholders in the semiconductor industry. Trust issues in electronic hardware span all stages of its life cycle - from creation of intellectual property (IP) blocks to manufacturing, test and deployment of hardware components and all abstraction levels - from chips to printed circuit boards (PCBs) to systems. The trust issues originate from a horizontal business model that promotes reliance of third-party untrusted facilities, tools, and IPs in the hardware life cycle. Today, designers are tasked with verifying the integrity of third-party IPs before incorporating them into system-on-chip (SoC) designs. Existing trust metric frameworks have limited applicability since they are not comprehensive. They capture only a subset of vulnerabilities such as potential vulnerabilities introduced through design mistakes and CAD tools, or quantify features in a design that target a particular Trojan model. Therefore, current practice uses ad-hoc security analysis of IP cores. In this paper, we propose a vector-based comprehensive coverage metric that quantifies the overall trust of an IP considering both vulnerabilities and direct malicious modifications. We use a variable weighted sum of a design's functional coverage, structural coverage, and asset coverage to assess an IP's integrity. Designers can also effectively use our trust metric to compare the relative trustworthiness of functionally equivalent third-party IPs. To demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the proposed metric, we utilize our trust metric on Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted variants of an IP. Our results demonstrate that we are able to successfully distinguish between trusted and untrusted IPs.","PeriodicalId":391209,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 56th Annual Design Automation Conference 2019","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 56th Annual Design Automation Conference 2019","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3316781.3323488","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Electronic hardware trust is an emerging concern for all stakeholders in the semiconductor industry. Trust issues in electronic hardware span all stages of its life cycle - from creation of intellectual property (IP) blocks to manufacturing, test and deployment of hardware components and all abstraction levels - from chips to printed circuit boards (PCBs) to systems. The trust issues originate from a horizontal business model that promotes reliance of third-party untrusted facilities, tools, and IPs in the hardware life cycle. Today, designers are tasked with verifying the integrity of third-party IPs before incorporating them into system-on-chip (SoC) designs. Existing trust metric frameworks have limited applicability since they are not comprehensive. They capture only a subset of vulnerabilities such as potential vulnerabilities introduced through design mistakes and CAD tools, or quantify features in a design that target a particular Trojan model. Therefore, current practice uses ad-hoc security analysis of IP cores. In this paper, we propose a vector-based comprehensive coverage metric that quantifies the overall trust of an IP considering both vulnerabilities and direct malicious modifications. We use a variable weighted sum of a design's functional coverage, structural coverage, and asset coverage to assess an IP's integrity. Designers can also effectively use our trust metric to compare the relative trustworthiness of functionally equivalent third-party IPs. To demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the proposed metric, we utilize our trust metric on Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted variants of an IP. Our results demonstrate that we are able to successfully distinguish between trusted and untrusted IPs.