{"title":"What do Exceptions in MAE Definitions Except?","authors":"Robert T. Miller","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3854238","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"MAE cases arising from the COVID-19 pandemic such as AB Stable and KCake have focused attention on the exceptions typically contained in the definition of the term “Material Adverse Effect.” That is, merger agreements typically define the (capitalized) term “Material Adverse Effect” to be any event that has or would reasonably be expected to have an (uncapitalized) material adverse effect on the target, other than certain excepted events such as general changes in business, market or industry conditions, changes in law, or force majeure events. The COVID-19 cases have exposed a latent ambiguity in this definition because, while the definition assumes that a single event causes a material adverse effect on the target, in the COVID-19 cases the causal background to the supposed material adverse effect was more complex, with one event (the pandemic) causing a second event (e.g., governmental lockdown orders) and the second event causing the material adverse effect on the target. If the MAE definition allocates the risk of both events to the same party, then clearly that party bears the risk of any resulting material adverse effect, but what happens if, say, the risk of a pandemic is allocated to the target but the risk of changes in law (such as lockdown orders) is allocated to the acquirer? Albeit only in dicta, AB Stable and KCake answered this question by saying, in effect, that if the risk of either event is allocated to the acquirer, there is no Material Adverse Effect. This article argues that this reasoning is unsound. The argument begins from the fundamental point that, under the express terms of the typical MAE definition, a (capitalized) Material Adverse Effect is an event that causes an (uncapitalized) material adverse effect;it is counterintuitive but plainly correct that a Material Adverse Effect is thus not a material adverse effect but an event that causes a material adverse effect. Furthermore, MAE definitions allocate risk on the basis of events, not effects, and they do so not because parties care about the events in and of themselves but because of the tendency of the events to cause material adverse effects. Hence, in allocating the risk of a certain event, the parties are allocating the risk not only of the event itself but also of all other events reasonably expected to follow from the event, up to and including any reasonably-expected material adverse effect on the target. This means, for example, that if the target bears the risk of a pandemic, it also bears the risk of everything reasonably expected to follow from any pandemic that occurs, including any reasonably-expected lockdown orders, up to and including any reasonably-expected material adverse effect, even if the MAE definition includes exceptions related to changes in law that would otherwise except lockdown orders. Even if the lockdown orders are mistakenly regarded as excepted, the pandemic was not excepted, and so if the pandemic would reasonably be expected to result in a material adverse effect (via lockdown orders or otherwise), then the pandemic is a Material Adverse Effect even if the lockdown orders (because they are excepted) are not. Courts have misunderstood this point because they have conflated Material Adverse Effects with material adverse effects and treated the exceptions in the MAE definition as if they applied to material adverse effects rather than to events causing material adverse effects. The article traces the origin of this confusion to one of the author’s own law review articles from 2009. Finally, the article discusses the import of the language introducing the exceptions in the MAE definition that sometimes expands the scope of the exceptions in various ways.","PeriodicalId":204227,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Corporate Law Including Merger & Acquisitions Law (Sub-Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Corporate Law Including Merger & Acquisitions Law (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3854238","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
MAE cases arising from the COVID-19 pandemic such as AB Stable and KCake have focused attention on the exceptions typically contained in the definition of the term “Material Adverse Effect.” That is, merger agreements typically define the (capitalized) term “Material Adverse Effect” to be any event that has or would reasonably be expected to have an (uncapitalized) material adverse effect on the target, other than certain excepted events such as general changes in business, market or industry conditions, changes in law, or force majeure events. The COVID-19 cases have exposed a latent ambiguity in this definition because, while the definition assumes that a single event causes a material adverse effect on the target, in the COVID-19 cases the causal background to the supposed material adverse effect was more complex, with one event (the pandemic) causing a second event (e.g., governmental lockdown orders) and the second event causing the material adverse effect on the target. If the MAE definition allocates the risk of both events to the same party, then clearly that party bears the risk of any resulting material adverse effect, but what happens if, say, the risk of a pandemic is allocated to the target but the risk of changes in law (such as lockdown orders) is allocated to the acquirer? Albeit only in dicta, AB Stable and KCake answered this question by saying, in effect, that if the risk of either event is allocated to the acquirer, there is no Material Adverse Effect. This article argues that this reasoning is unsound. The argument begins from the fundamental point that, under the express terms of the typical MAE definition, a (capitalized) Material Adverse Effect is an event that causes an (uncapitalized) material adverse effect;it is counterintuitive but plainly correct that a Material Adverse Effect is thus not a material adverse effect but an event that causes a material adverse effect. Furthermore, MAE definitions allocate risk on the basis of events, not effects, and they do so not because parties care about the events in and of themselves but because of the tendency of the events to cause material adverse effects. Hence, in allocating the risk of a certain event, the parties are allocating the risk not only of the event itself but also of all other events reasonably expected to follow from the event, up to and including any reasonably-expected material adverse effect on the target. This means, for example, that if the target bears the risk of a pandemic, it also bears the risk of everything reasonably expected to follow from any pandemic that occurs, including any reasonably-expected lockdown orders, up to and including any reasonably-expected material adverse effect, even if the MAE definition includes exceptions related to changes in law that would otherwise except lockdown orders. Even if the lockdown orders are mistakenly regarded as excepted, the pandemic was not excepted, and so if the pandemic would reasonably be expected to result in a material adverse effect (via lockdown orders or otherwise), then the pandemic is a Material Adverse Effect even if the lockdown orders (because they are excepted) are not. Courts have misunderstood this point because they have conflated Material Adverse Effects with material adverse effects and treated the exceptions in the MAE definition as if they applied to material adverse effects rather than to events causing material adverse effects. The article traces the origin of this confusion to one of the author’s own law review articles from 2009. Finally, the article discusses the import of the language introducing the exceptions in the MAE definition that sometimes expands the scope of the exceptions in various ways.
AB Stable和KCake等因新冠肺炎大流行引起的MAE案例将重点放在了“重大不良影响”定义中通常包含的例外情况上。也就是说,并购协议通常将(大写)术语“重大不利影响”定义为对目标产生或合理预期会产生(未大写)重大不利影响的任何事件,但某些例外事件,如业务、市场或行业状况的一般变化、法律变更或不可抗力事件除外。2019冠状病毒病病例暴露了这一定义中潜在的模糊性,因为该定义假设单个事件对目标造成重大不利影响,但在2019冠状病毒病病例中,假定的重大不利影响的因果背景更为复杂,一个事件(大流行)导致第二个事件(例如,政府封锁令),第二个事件对目标造成重大不利影响。如果MAE定义将这两种事件的风险分配给同一方,那么显然该方承担由此产生的任何重大不利影响的风险,但如果将大流行的风险分配给目标方,而将法律变化(如封锁令)的风险分配给收购方,会发生什么情况?AB Stable和KCake只是口头上回答了这个问题,他们说,实际上,如果任何一个事件的风险都分配给收购方,就不会产生重大不利影响。这篇文章认为这种推理是站不住脚的。争论从最基本的一点开始,在典型的MAE定义的明确条款下,(大写)重大不利影响是导致(未大写)重大不利影响的事件;因此,重大不利影响不是重大不利影响,而是导致重大不利影响的事件,这是违反直觉的,但显然是正确的。此外,MAE的定义是根据事件而不是结果来分配风险的,它们这样做不是因为各方关心事件本身,而是因为事件有可能造成重大不利影响。因此,在分配某一事件的风险时,各方不仅分配了该事件本身的风险,而且还分配了该事件之后合理预期会发生的所有其他事件的风险,直至并包括合理预期对目标产生的任何重大不利影响。这意味着,例如,如果目标国承受大流行的风险,它也承担任何合理预期发生的大流行所带来的一切风险,包括任何合理预期的封锁令,直至并包括任何合理预期的重大不利影响,即使MAE的定义包括与法律变化有关的例外情况,否则将不包括封锁令。即使封锁令被错误地视为例外,大流行也没有例外,因此,如果合理地预期大流行会导致重大不利影响(通过封锁令或其他方式),那么即使封锁令(因为它们是例外)没有,大流行也是一种重大不利影响。法院误解了这一点,因为他们将重大不利影响与重大不利影响混为一谈,并将MAE定义中的例外视为适用于重大不利影响,而不是适用于导致重大不利影响的事件。这篇文章将这种困惑的根源追溯到作者自己2009年的一篇法律评论文章。最后,本文讨论了在MAE定义中引入异常的语言的重要性,这种语言有时会以各种方式扩展异常的范围。