Transient Model-Based Detection Scheme for False Data Injection Attacks in Microgrids

Abstract

Centralized controllers are popularly used in Microgrid as it ensures its economic and stable operation. The measurements taken for such a controller are prone to false data injection (FDI) attacks which may result in destabilizing the microgrid. This paper presents a technique that uses transient information for detecting the FDI attacks in a microgrid. The detection technique works on the principle that any legitimate change in the system will be accompanied by a transient that can be observed by the measurement system. The transient solution is obtained using a backward forward sweep technique which is developed in this paper. This technique is much efficient than the Electromagnetic Transient Program (EMTP) as it solves the dynamic equations by exploiting the radial feature of the microgrid network. The solution is compared against the measured values such that in the event of an FDI attack, transients may not be present and hence it will have high deviations. The proposed technique is evaluated on a microgrid under the FDI attack and the results are presented.