{"title":"Minding One's Business: On the How, When, and Where of Cognition","authors":"Wolff‐Michael Roth","doi":"10.1145/3105726.3105747","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Where is the mind when we mind our business, that is, when we do what we characteristically do? Is mind between the two ears and underneath the skull? Is it in the business that has been minded? Or is it somewhere else? A foray into the literature on theories of cognition (knowing, learning) has to be confusing. There is research that looks for mind in neurons and neuronal connections; other studies assume an enacted or embodied mind; others again consider mind to be in society. How we think about cognition has direct implication on when and where we look for it when conducting research, and how we go about teaching a field. If we assume a classical computer metaphor, then learning occurs when information is transferred to the brain (mind) of the learner where it is stored, and lecturing constitutes a main pedagogical modality. If we assume that knowledge is actively constructed when we engage in relevant activities, then one or another student-centered pedagogy will be the method of choice. When the metaphor is the embodied or enactivist mind, then opportunities tend to be provided for students to act with the relevant practical objects. In this talk, I work through some empirical examples to exhibit how, when, and where to look to find cognition that is not reduced to the physical body (including brain physiology) or to some non-physical mind and that is not reduced to the individual or social. Instead, the physical or mental dimensions, the individual or social aspects, are but manifestations of a thinking body that itself is invisible in the same way as the wave functions in quantum mechanics. Minding one's business, i.e., acting so that what is done is intelligible and intelligent, simultaneously is individual and social, sensuous (material, specific) and super-sensuous (ideal, universal). As a result, phenomena commonly searched for in the brain--e.g., remembering, perceiving, knowing a concept, reasoning--manifest themselves, often contradictorily, in different modes and modalities. Some implications are sketched for computing education.","PeriodicalId":267640,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on International Computing Education Research","volume":"262 1-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on International Computing Education Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3105726.3105747","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Where is the mind when we mind our business, that is, when we do what we characteristically do? Is mind between the two ears and underneath the skull? Is it in the business that has been minded? Or is it somewhere else? A foray into the literature on theories of cognition (knowing, learning) has to be confusing. There is research that looks for mind in neurons and neuronal connections; other studies assume an enacted or embodied mind; others again consider mind to be in society. How we think about cognition has direct implication on when and where we look for it when conducting research, and how we go about teaching a field. If we assume a classical computer metaphor, then learning occurs when information is transferred to the brain (mind) of the learner where it is stored, and lecturing constitutes a main pedagogical modality. If we assume that knowledge is actively constructed when we engage in relevant activities, then one or another student-centered pedagogy will be the method of choice. When the metaphor is the embodied or enactivist mind, then opportunities tend to be provided for students to act with the relevant practical objects. In this talk, I work through some empirical examples to exhibit how, when, and where to look to find cognition that is not reduced to the physical body (including brain physiology) or to some non-physical mind and that is not reduced to the individual or social. Instead, the physical or mental dimensions, the individual or social aspects, are but manifestations of a thinking body that itself is invisible in the same way as the wave functions in quantum mechanics. Minding one's business, i.e., acting so that what is done is intelligible and intelligent, simultaneously is individual and social, sensuous (material, specific) and super-sensuous (ideal, universal). As a result, phenomena commonly searched for in the brain--e.g., remembering, perceiving, knowing a concept, reasoning--manifest themselves, often contradictorily, in different modes and modalities. Some implications are sketched for computing education.