The optimal carbon emission reduction and advertising strategy with dynamic market share in the supply chain

Abstract

PurposeAs the quality of the environment decreases, enterprises and consumers' awareness of environmental protection is constantly improving. More and more enterprises begin to increase their investment in carbon emission reduction and attract environmentally friendly consumers to buy low-carbon products through advertising. The purpose of this paper is to utilize a realistic differential game model to provide dynamic carbon emission reduction strategies, advertising strategies and cooperation methods for complex supply chain members from a long-term perspective.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses the extend Vidale-Wolfe model (V-W model) to discuss the dynamic joint emission reduction strategy in the supply chain.Findings(1) When consumers' awareness of environmental protection increases, on the whole, carbon emission reduction and profit of products show an upward trend. (2) From a long-term perspective, the manufacturer's advertising subsidy to one of the retailers is the best choice. If the strength of the two retailers is unbalanced, the manufacturer will choose to cooperate with the dominant retailer. (3) Advertising, as a marketing means for retailers to promote low-carbon products, can alleviate the adverse effects of prisoner's dilemma in a semi-cooperative state, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimization result.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper focuses on the analysis of the situation that when the manufacturer is the leader and thinks that consumers are active advocates of low-carbon products.Originality/valueThe results of this paper can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.