A System of Fiduciary Protections for Mutual Funds

H. Jackson
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Abstract

The regulation of mutual funds in the United States arguably contains the world’s most extensive system of fiduciary protection, buttressed by elaborate liability rules and a host of procedural protections and mandatory disclosure requirements designed to facilitate investor protection and choice. The intensity of this regulatory structure is a subject of perennial debate, as public officials and policy analysts attempt to balance the cost of compliance and oversight against benefits to investors. Over time, government officials have made numerous supervisory accommodations to ameliorate the system’s costs and facilitate industry innovations. But, the burdens of this enhanced system of fiduciary protections for mutual funds remain significant and have encouraged industry participants to evade these legal requirements in a number of ways, such as the creation of alternative vehicles for collective investments (including insurance products and managed accounts of various sorts) and the imbedding of regulated mutual funds into other legal structures that escape the full application of the enhanced systemic of fiduciary protections for mutual funds. Technological innovations, such as robo-advising, are likely to accelerate this trend. In this chapter, I explore this important illustration of regulatory arbitrage and suggest areas where aspects of mutual fund regulation might appropriately be extended to functionally similar investment vehicles.
共同基金的信托保护制度
可以说,美国对共同基金的监管包含了世界上最广泛的信托保护体系,以详尽的责任规则、一系列程序保护和强制性披露要求为支撑,旨在促进投资者的保护和选择。这种监管结构的强度是一个长期争论的话题,因为政府官员和政策分析人士试图在合规和监督的成本与投资者的利益之间取得平衡。随着时间的推移,政府官员做出了许多监管调整,以改善该系统的成本并促进行业创新。但是,这种增强的共同基金信托保护制度的负担仍然很大,并鼓励行业参与者以多种方式逃避这些法律要求,例如,为集体投资(包括保险产品和各种管理账户)创建替代工具,以及将受监管的共同基金嵌入到其他法律结构中,这些结构逃避了对共同基金加强的信托保护体系的全面应用。机器人咨询等技术创新可能会加速这一趋势。在本章中,我探讨了监管套利的这一重要例证,并提出了共同基金监管方面可能适当扩展到功能类似的投资工具的领域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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