Low-cost mitigation of privacy loss due to radiometric identification

J. Haas, Yih-Chun Hu, N. Laurenti
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Recently, there has been much interest in using radiometric identification (also known as wireless fingerprinting) for the purposes of authentication. Previous work has shown that using radiometric identification can discriminate among devices with a high degree of accuracy when simultaneously using multiple radiometric characteristics. Additionally, researchers have noted the potential for wireless fingerprinting to be used for more devious purposes, specifically that of privacy invasion or compromise. In fact, any such radiometric characteristic that is useful for authentication is useful for privacy compromise. To date, there has not been any proposal of how to mitigate such privacy loss for many of these radiometric characteristics, and specifically no such proposal for how to mitigate such privacy loss in a low-cost manner. In this paper, we investigate some limits of an attacker's ability to compromise privacy, specifically an attacker that uses a transmitter's carrier frequency. We propose low-cost mechanisms for mitigating privacy loss for various radiometric characteristics. In our development and evaluation, we specifically consider a vehicular network (VANET) environment. We consider this environment in particular because VANETs will have the potential to leak significant, long-term information that could be used to compromise drivers' personal information such as home address, work address, and the locations of any businesses the driver frequents. While tracking a vehicle using visually observable information (e.g., license plates) to obtain personal information is possible, such means require line-of-sight, whereas radiometric identification would not. Finally, we evaluate one of our proposed mechanisms via simulation. Specifically, we evaluate our carrier frequency switching mechanism, comparing it to the theory we develop, and we show the precision with which vehicles will need to switch their physical layer identities given our parameterization for VANETs.
低成本减轻辐射识别造成的隐私损失
最近,人们对使用辐射识别(也称为无线指纹识别)进行身份验证很感兴趣。先前的工作表明,当同时使用多个辐射特征时,使用辐射识别可以高度准确地区分设备。此外,研究人员还注意到,无线指纹识别可能被用于更不正当的目的,特别是侵犯或破坏隐私。事实上,任何对身份验证有用的辐射特征都对隐私泄露有用。到目前为止,还没有任何关于如何减轻这些辐射特征的隐私损失的建议,特别是关于如何以低成本的方式减轻这种隐私损失的建议。在本文中,我们研究了攻击者破坏隐私的能力的一些限制,特别是使用发射机载波频率的攻击者。我们提出了低成本的机制来减轻各种辐射特性的隐私损失。在我们的开发和评估中,我们特别考虑了车载网络(VANET)环境。我们特别考虑这种环境,因为VANETs将有可能泄露重要的、长期的信息,这些信息可能被用来泄露司机的个人信息,如家庭住址、工作地址和司机经常光顾的任何企业的位置。虽然使用视觉上可观察到的信息(例如,车牌)跟踪车辆以获取个人信息是可能的,但这种方法需要视线,而辐射识别则不需要。最后,我们通过模拟来评估我们提出的机制之一。具体来说,我们评估了我们的载波频率切换机制,将其与我们开发的理论进行比较,并展示了在给定vanet参数化的情况下,车辆需要切换其物理层身份的精度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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