Utilitarismo y derechos humanos: ¿un binomio irreductiblemente separable?

Abstract

En este trabajo se parte de la idea de que los derechos humanos son incompatibles con el utilitarismo, dado que es imposible aplicarles el fundamento utilitarista. El objetivo radica en demostrar que los derechos humanos y el utilitarismo no se encuentran reducidos a un binomio indefectiblemente separable, como puede vislumbrarse prima facie. Para lograr lo anterior, se estudia si la postura utilitarista es realmente divergente con la teoria y la aplicacion practica de los derechos humanos.  Abstract This work is based on the idea that human rights are incompatible with utilitarianism since it is impossible to apply them to the utilitarian basis. The objective is to demonstrate that human rights and utilitarianism are not reduced to an unfailingly separable binomial as can be seen at first sight. To achieve the above, it is studied if the utilitarian position is really divergent with the theory and the practical application of human rights. In consequence, it is explored in what conditions it is possible to displace a human right in favor of another; it is also considered if the defenders of the human rights take into account the happiness or well-being of people when choosing one right instead of another.