The Choice Model

Abstract

According to the choice model, damnation is, in some important sense, chosen by the damned: God is simply respecting human free will in consigning some to hell. The choice model is subdivided into two general forms, corresponding to the way that damnation can be chosen either directly or indirectly. The first form, which sees damnation as the explicit and direct object of choice of those who are finally lost, faces the challenge of explaining motive: why would anyone freely choose eternal damnation? The second form, in which damnation is the natural consequence of certain free choices but not that which is chosen directly, faces the challenge of explaining why God does not annihilate the damned, mercifully putting them out of their misery. The author argues that Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death contains conceptual resources for addressing both of these challenges and thereby strengthening the choice model significantly; nevertheless, even this version faces difficulties that prevent it from being entirely satisfactory.