Private Multiparty Set Intersection Protocol in Rational Model

K. Emura, A. Miyaji, Mohammad Shahriar Rahman
{"title":"Private Multiparty Set Intersection Protocol in Rational Model","authors":"K. Emura, A. Miyaji, Mohammad Shahriar Rahman","doi":"10.1109/TrustCom.2013.54","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Privacy-preserving set intersection protocol is desirable for many practical applications. Malicious and semi-honest adversarial models in cryptographic settings have been considered mostly to design such protocols for privacy-preserving set intersection. In a semi-honest or malicious model an adversary is assumed to follow or arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, respectively. Protocols in semi-honest model can utilize cheaper cryptographic primitives, but that comes with a cost of weaker security. On the other hand, strong security is guaranteed by the malicious model whereby expensive cyptographic primitives are required. However, achieving a desired level of privacy with efficient computation is what we need for practical implementations. In this paper, we address the multiparty private set intersection problem using simple cryptographic primitives, in which each of the N parties learns no elements other than the intersection of their N private datasets. The private set intersection is constructed in game-theoretic model, where instead of being semi-honest or malicious the parties are viewed as rational and are assumed (only) to act in their own self-interest. We consider both single player deviation and coalitions, and show that our protocol satisfies computational strict Nash equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":206739,"journal":{"name":"2013 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom.2013.54","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Privacy-preserving set intersection protocol is desirable for many practical applications. Malicious and semi-honest adversarial models in cryptographic settings have been considered mostly to design such protocols for privacy-preserving set intersection. In a semi-honest or malicious model an adversary is assumed to follow or arbitrarily deviate from the protocol, respectively. Protocols in semi-honest model can utilize cheaper cryptographic primitives, but that comes with a cost of weaker security. On the other hand, strong security is guaranteed by the malicious model whereby expensive cyptographic primitives are required. However, achieving a desired level of privacy with efficient computation is what we need for practical implementations. In this paper, we address the multiparty private set intersection problem using simple cryptographic primitives, in which each of the N parties learns no elements other than the intersection of their N private datasets. The private set intersection is constructed in game-theoretic model, where instead of being semi-honest or malicious the parties are viewed as rational and are assumed (only) to act in their own self-interest. We consider both single player deviation and coalitions, and show that our protocol satisfies computational strict Nash equilibrium.
Rational模型中的私有多方集合交叉协议
隐私保护集交叉协议是许多实际应用所需要的。在密码设置中,恶意和半诚实的对抗模型主要用于设计隐私保护集相交的协议。在半诚实模型或恶意模型中,假定对手分别遵循或任意偏离协议。半诚实模型中的协议可以利用更便宜的加密原语,但这是以安全性较弱为代价的。另一方面,恶意模型保证了强大的安全性,因此需要昂贵的密码原语。然而,在实际实现中,我们需要通过高效的计算来实现期望的隐私级别。在本文中,我们使用简单的密码原语解决了多方私有集的交集问题,其中N方中的每一方都只学习他们N个私有数据集的交集。私集交集是在博弈论模型中构建的,而不是半诚实或恶意的各方被视为理性的,并被假设(仅)为自己的利益而行动。我们考虑了单个参与者偏差和联盟,并证明了我们的协议满足计算严格纳什均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信