Societal Cyberwar Theory Applied: The Disruptive Power of State Actor Aggression for Public Sector Information Security

Abstract

The modern welfare state faces significant challenges to be able to sustain a systematic cyber conflict that pursues the institutional destabilization of the targeted state. Cyber defense in these advanced democracies are limited, unstructured, and focused on anecdotal cyber interchanges of marginal geopolitical value. The factual reach of government activities once a conflict is initiated is likely to be miniscule. Therefore the information security activities, and assessments leading to cyber defense efforts, have to be strategically pre-event coordinated within the state. This coordination should be following a framework that ensures institutional stability, public trust, and limit challenges to the state. The paper presents a case to use societal cyber war theory to create a public sector cyber defense strategy beforehand facing a massive state actor initiated automated systematic cyber attacks to limit the risk for a societal system shock. Societal cyber war theory utilizes a theoretical framework created by political scientist Dwight Waldo for government stability, turns it upside down, and uses the theory to identify cyber targets and aim points. As a theory it can be used in cyber defense and offense as the institutional weaknesses can be either attacked or defended. According to societal cyber war theory the aim points to be targeted by an automated premeditated systematic attack that will cripple the targeted nation is the five pillars that upholds the state - legitimacy, authority, knowledge, control, and confidence. The failure to protect the institutional stability could undermine the state's ability to avoid submission to foreign power.