Unique American Health Insurance Policies Cause Price Inflation

Michael P. Lynch
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Abstract

Many studies conclude that the main reason Americans pay more for health care is that its providers charge higher prices. There is little agreement on why prices are higher. I argue that higher prices are caused by a type of insurance contract unique to America. “Service benefit” contracts originated by Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans paid no monetary “indemnity” to the people insured. Rather payments went directly to providers. Initially participating providers accepted the plan benefit as payment in full, and, so long as this remained true, these contracts provided no special incentive for providers to raise their prices. This changed around 1950, when independent insurance companies began to market a new type of policy called “major medical”. These policies were imitated by the Blues and, in so doing, they introduced “coinsurance” and “deductibles” provisions into the service benefit plans. In these new service benefit hybrids, providers were free to charge patients more than the plan benefit to be paid directly by the patient. An unintended consequence of this development was the release of an inflationary spiral. A model, based on the theory of two-sided matching, provides quantitative predictions of the increase in provider prices caused by insurance. The model can quantitatively account for the inflationary spiral observed from 1949 to 1959. If service benefit insurance is the major cause of the rise in provider prices, then a reform proposed here could reverse the spiral.
独特的美国健康保险政策导致物价上涨
许多研究得出结论,美国人为医疗保健支付更多费用的主要原因是医疗服务提供者收取更高的价格。价格上涨的原因众说纷纭。我认为较高的价格是由美国特有的一种保险合同造成的。由蓝十字/蓝盾计划发起的“服务福利”合同不向被保险人支付金钱“赔偿”。相反,付款直接流向了供应商。最初参与的供应商接受全额支付计划的福利,只要这种情况仍然存在,这些合同就不会为供应商提供提高价格的特别激励。这种情况在1950年左右发生了变化,当时独立保险公司开始推销一种名为“重大医疗”的新型保单。这些政策被蓝军所模仿,在这样做的过程中,他们在服务福利计划中引入了“共同保险”和“免赔”条款。在这些新的服务福利混合方案中,医疗服务提供者可以自由地向患者收取比由患者直接支付的计划福利更高的费用。这种发展的一个意想不到的后果是通货膨胀螺旋的释放。一个基于双边匹配理论的模型,提供了保险引起的供应商价格上涨的定量预测。该模型可以定量地解释从1949年到1959年观测到的通货膨胀螺旋。如果服务福利保险是供应商价格上涨的主要原因,那么这里提出的改革可能会扭转这种螺旋式上升。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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