Coordination of Limited Commercial Return

Jens Bengtsson
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Abstract

This paper analyses coordination in a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer, where the retailer has the opportunity to return products at midlife and end-of-life. The paper examines particularly the coordination problem when the supplier has the opportunity to realise a limited amount of overstock items at a higher price than the retailer at midlife. In this paper return options are introduced in the channel, where an option gives the holder the right to return a product at midlife in exchange for a pre-specified amount of money. It is shown that the supplier must, to achieve coordination, determine one exercise price of the options and two return rebates, where the latter guarantee the retailer an amount of money for each product returned, at midlife and end-of-life, without a corresponding option. Conditions for pricing of return options and conditions for wholesale prices are derived as well. A numerical study shows that the supplier is better off when the number of return options increases. The numerical study also shows that the coordinating option price is relatively unaffected by the return rebate in the second period, but is more dependent on the exercise price and return rebate at midlife, which in turn are dependent on the production costs.
有限商业回报的协调
本文分析了由供应商和零售商组成的供应链中的协调问题,其中零售商有机会在产品的中期和末期退货。本文特别研究了当供应商有机会以比零售商更高的价格实现有限数量的库存项目时的协调问题。在本文中,在渠道中引入了返回期权,其中期权赋予持有人在中年时返回产品的权利,以换取预先指定的金额。结果表明,为了实现协调,供应商必须确定一个期权的行权价格和两个退货折扣,其中后者保证零售商在生命周期中期和生命周期结束时每个退货产品的金额,而没有相应的期权。并推导了收益期权定价条件和批发价格条件。数值研究表明,当退货选项数量增加时,供应商的状况会更好。数值研究还表明,协调期权价格相对不受第二阶段回报回扣的影响,但更多地依赖于中年行权价格和回报回扣,而后者又依赖于生产成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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