{"title":"ՆՈՐՄԱՏԻՎ ԻՐԱՎԱԿԱՆ ԱԿՏԵՐԻ ՕՐԻՆԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՆԿԱՏՄԱՄԲ ԴԱՏԱԿԱՆ ՎԵՐԱՀՍԿՈՂՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՈՐՈՇ ՀԻՄՆԱՀԱՐՑԵՐԸ ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՅԻՆ ԻՐԱՎՈՒՆՔՈՒՄ","authors":"Rafik Khandanyan","doi":"10.52063/25792652-2021.2-87","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Тhe aim of the article is to examine the development and mechanisms of direct and indirect judicial control over normative legal acts in Soviet Union and tօ look into power of the courts in that sphere. In the course of the study, both scientific (the principle of historicity, analysis, synthesis)\nand special (formal logical, comparative legal) methods were applied. During the research the competence of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union o assessment of legality of normative legal acts was examined, which, as concluded, can not be considered as control over legality of normative legal acts, as the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union did not have the competence to invalidate that acts.\nThe study also resulted in the following conclusion: during certain periods of the existence of the Soviet Union there was actually both direct and indirect judicial control over the legality of normative legal acts, but there was no special and comprehensive legal regulation regarding it.\nMore accurately, indirect judicial control was practiced at the beginning of the establishment of the USSR and also after 1970s and was manifested in the power of the courts to refuse to apply specific regulatory legal acts or to act not in accordance with them. As for the direct judicial control, it was only realized on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union by adopting «Law on Propety in the USSR» on 06.03.1990 and it led to the recognition of the right to contest normative legal acts concerning property in courts. The absence of certain and complex legal regulations on direct and indirect judicial control was because of some political observations and the absence of principle of the separation of powers.","PeriodicalId":207059,"journal":{"name":"Scientific Artsakh","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Scientific Artsakh","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.52063/25792652-2021.2-87","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Тhe aim of the article is to examine the development and mechanisms of direct and indirect judicial control over normative legal acts in Soviet Union and tօ look into power of the courts in that sphere. In the course of the study, both scientific (the principle of historicity, analysis, synthesis)
and special (formal logical, comparative legal) methods were applied. During the research the competence of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union o assessment of legality of normative legal acts was examined, which, as concluded, can not be considered as control over legality of normative legal acts, as the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union did not have the competence to invalidate that acts.
The study also resulted in the following conclusion: during certain periods of the existence of the Soviet Union there was actually both direct and indirect judicial control over the legality of normative legal acts, but there was no special and comprehensive legal regulation regarding it.
More accurately, indirect judicial control was practiced at the beginning of the establishment of the USSR and also after 1970s and was manifested in the power of the courts to refuse to apply specific regulatory legal acts or to act not in accordance with them. As for the direct judicial control, it was only realized on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union by adopting «Law on Propety in the USSR» on 06.03.1990 and it led to the recognition of the right to contest normative legal acts concerning property in courts. The absence of certain and complex legal regulations on direct and indirect judicial control was because of some political observations and the absence of principle of the separation of powers.