Perspectives of European Company Law (Prospettive Del Diritto Societario Europeo) (Italian)

P. Santella
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The Freedom of establishment for companies introduced by the Treaty of Rome left member States the freedom to define the criteria that identify the company seat and the modalities to transfer its seat. This article describes the various solutions that have been tried in the last 50 years to allow full freedom of establishment, from the initiatives adopted at the beginning of the European Communities to the current legislative and non-legislative proposals. At first a convention was signed among the then six Member States to coordinate national legislations on conflicts of laws and international private law, that is those national provisions which disciplined the exit from and entrance in their legal systems of a company. The convention allowed companies to move their seat from one Member State to another on condition to apply the relevant provisions of both national legislations. The convention was never ratified by The Netherlands because it did not allow to move the company seat subject only to the provisions of the host Member State. At that time (1968) The Netherlands were convinced to have the most flexible company legislation and saw itself as a potential beneficiary of the migration of companies’ seat from other Member States. Since it was clear that fear of forum shopping was as an obstacle to full freedom of establishment, the European Commission then adopted an action plan aimed at harmonizing the company legislations of the Member States to reduce opportunities for forum shopping in the first place. Such a choice produced important results, leading to the adoption of several company law directives. However, the harmonization process stopped in the mid-1980s because of the fundamental differences among the Member States, in the first place in terms of the mandatory participation of employees to companies’ management and groups of companies. This is the main reason why only some of the legislative directives and regulations instrumental to full freedom of establishment have been adopted (European Company statute and directive Cross-Border Mergers) accompanied by restrictions to the regime of the seat and by mandatory requirements on employees’ participation to company management, while the 14th directive on seat transfer has not been adopted. In the last few years the European Court of Justice has adopted a series of rulings which pave an alternative way towards freedom of establishment based on mutual recognition of the national seat regimes. Finally, with the proposal for a European private company statute the European Commission has chosen to circumvent the differences among national company law provisions by allowing wide recourse to freedom of contract in the drafting of company statutes. Another obstacle to freedom of establishment is represented by the absence of a European company tax regime sufficiently harmonized to prevent that company mobility be a vehicle for fiscal forum shopping and that Member States adopt restrictive taxation provisions. The experience of company mobility in the United States indicates that full freedom of establishment is possible only in a context characterized by the absence of strong differences in the company law and taxation provisions at State level. Company mobility is accepted because it is linked to the different efficiency of the State Courts and legal systems in general and to moderate differences in company law provisions at State level. On the other hand, in the European Union the potential efficiency gains in terms of lower cost of capital that could be brought through full freedom of establishment are probably higher than in the United States because of the greater differences in the efficiency of the Courts and of the legal systems among the Member States.
欧洲公司法展望(prospect Del Diritto Societario Europeo)(意大利语)
《罗马条约》规定的公司设立自由使成员国可以自由确定确定公司所在地的标准和转让公司所在地的方式。本文描述了在过去50年中为允许充分自由建立而尝试的各种解决办法,从欧洲共同体开始时通过的倡议到目前的立法和非立法建议。起初,当时的六个会员国签署了一项公约,以协调关于法律冲突和国际私法的国家立法,即那些在其法律制度中规定公司退出和进入的国家规定。该公约允许公司将其席位从一个会员国移到另一个会员国,条件是适用两国立法的有关规定。荷兰从未批准该公约,因为它不允许只根据东道国的规定移动公司席位。当时(1968年),荷兰被认为拥有最灵活的公司立法,并认为自己是公司从其他会员国迁址的潜在受益者。由于很明显,对购买公司地的恐惧是建立充分自由的一个障碍,因此欧洲委员会随后通过了一项行动计划,旨在协调各成员国的公司立法,首先减少购买公司地的机会。这样的选择产生了重要的结果,导致了几项公司法指令的通过。然而,由于会员国之间的根本差异,协调进程在1980年代中期停止,首先是在雇员强制参与公司管理和公司集团方面。这就是为什么只有一些立法指令和法规有助于建立充分的自由被采用(欧洲公司法规和指令跨境合并)伴随着限制制度的席位和对员工参与公司管理的强制性要求,而第14号指令的席位转移没有被采用的主要原因。在过去几年中,欧洲法院通过了一系列裁决,为在相互承认国家席位制度的基础上建立自由铺平了另一条道路。最后,在提出欧洲私人公司法规的建议时,欧盟委员会选择了规避各国公司法规定之间的差异,允许在起草公司法规时广泛诉诸合同自由。建立自由的另一个障碍是缺乏一个充分协调的欧洲公司税收制度,以防止公司流动性成为财政论坛购物的工具,会员国采取限制性税收规定。美国公司流动的经验表明,只有在州一级的公司法和税收规定没有很大差别的情况下,才可能有充分的设立自由。公司流动性之所以被接受,是因为它与国家法院和一般法律制度的不同效率有关,也与国家一级公司法规定的不同有关。另一方面,在欧洲联盟,由于充分的设立自由可以带来较低的资本成本,因此潜在的效率收益可能比在美国要高,因为各成员国之间法院和法律制度的效率差异更大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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