Avoiding Fields on Fire: Information Dissemination Policies for Environmentally Safe Crop-Residue Management

M. H. Farahani, Milind Dawande, G. Janakiraman, Shouqiang Wang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Agricultural open burning, i.e., the practice of burning crop residue in harvested fields to prepare land for sowing a new crop, is well-recognized as a significant contributor to CO2 and black-carbon emissions, and long-term climate change. Low-soil-tillage practices using a specific agricultural machine called Happy Seeder, which can sow the new seed without removing the previous crop residue, have emerged as the most effective and profitable alternative to open burning. However, given the limited number of Happy Seeders that the government can supply, and the fact that farmers incur a significant yield loss if they delay sowing the new crop, farmers are often unwilling to wait to be processed by the Happy Seeder and, instead, decide to burn their crop residue. We study how the government can use effective information-disclosure policies in the operation of Happy Seeders to minimize agricultural open burning. A Happy Seeder is assigned to process a group of farms in an arbitrary order. The government knows, but does not necessarily disclose, the schedule for the Happy Seeder at the start of the sowing season. Farmers incur a disutility per unit of time while waiting for the Happy Seeder due to the yield loss as a result of late sowing of the new crop. If the Happy Seeder processes a farm, then the farmer gains a positive utility. At the beginning of each period, each farmer decides whether to burn her crop residue or to wait, given the information provided by the government about the Happy Seeder's schedule. We propose a class of information-disclosure policies, which we refer to as dilatory policies, that provide no information to the farmers about the schedule until a pre-specified period and then reveal the entire schedule. By obtaining the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium under any dilatory policy, we show that the use of an optimal dilatory policy can significantly lower the number of farms burnt compared to that under the full-disclosure and the no-disclosure policies. Using data from the rice-wheat crop system in northwestern India -- an area of the world with the highest prevalence of open burning -- we conduct a comprehensive case study and demonstrate that the optimal dilatory policy can reduce CO2 and black-carbon emissions by at least 14%.
避免田地着火:环境安全作物残留管理的信息传播政策
农业露天焚烧,即在收获的田地中焚烧作物残茬,为播种新作物做准备的做法,被公认为是二氧化碳和黑碳排放的重要贡献者,也是长期气候变化的重要因素。使用一种名为“快乐播种机”(Happy Seeder)的特殊农业机器进行低土壤耕作,这种机器可以播种新种子,而不会清除以前的作物残留物,已经成为露天焚烧的最有效和最有利可图的替代方法。然而,由于政府提供的“快乐播种机”数量有限,再加上农民推迟播种会造成巨大的产量损失,农民往往不愿意等待“快乐播种机”的处理,而是决定烧掉他们的作物残渣。我们研究了政府如何在快乐播种机的运作中使用有效的信息披露政策来减少农业露天焚烧。“快乐播种者”被指派以任意顺序处理一组农场。政府知道快乐播种机在播种季节开始时的时间表,但不一定会透露。农民在等待“快乐播种机”的时候,每单位时间都会产生负效用,这是由于新作物播种晚了而导致的产量损失。如果快乐播种机处理一个农场,那么农民就会获得正效用。在每个时期的开始,每个农民根据政府提供的关于快乐播种者的时间表的信息,决定是烧掉她的作物残渣还是等待。我们提出了一类信息披露策略,我们称之为延迟策略,它们在预先指定的时间段之前不向农民提供有关计划的信息,然后显示整个计划。通过得到任意延迟策略下的唯一对称马尔可夫完美均衡,我们证明了与完全披露和不披露策略相比,使用最优延迟策略可以显著降低农场的燃烧数量。利用来自印度西北部(世界上露天焚烧最普遍的地区)的水稻-小麦作物系统的数据,我们进行了一个全面的案例研究,并证明了最佳的延迟政策可以减少至少14%的二氧化碳和黑碳排放。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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