Fraud Is Now Legal in Texas (for Some People)

V. Ricks
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Abstract

Three intermediate appellate courts in Texas have held that corporate actors—directors, officers, managers, shareholders, and probably common employees and agents—are immune from personal liability for fraud that they themselves commit as long as their deceit relates to or arises from a contractual obligation of the corporation. Similar actors in limited liability companies also enjoy immunity. These courts do not require that the business entities themselves be liable for the fraud. When the entities are not liable, these new holdings leave fraud victims no remedy at all, even if a jury would find fraud. One (or maybe two) Texas appellate courts have held otherwise. The Supreme Court of Texas will probably decide the issue, and one justice has already signed on. To date, these decisions have only been noticed in print by a few practicing attorneys. No commentator has questioned them. But the decisions are wrong. These courts claim to be following a statute, but the statute does not support the courts’ analysis. Nor does the statute’s legislative history. Surprising (and probably unnoticed) results strongly suggest the legislature never intended this reading. And what rationale could justify it? Fraud is the economic equivalent of theft. Practitioner comments on the decisions suggest that the cost of litigating fraud is too high. Texas’ reputation for pro-business policies might suggest this move is just helpful de-regulation, but it is not. Policing fraud is the only way to make markets safe for freedom of contract, and litigating fraud claims is the courts’ role. These decisions should be abandoned before they become the law in all of Texas and elsewhere.
欺诈在德克萨斯州现在是合法的(对一些人来说)
德克萨斯州的三个中级上诉法院认为,公司行为者——董事、高级职员、经理、股东,可能还有普通雇员和代理人——只要他们的欺诈行为与公司的合同义务有关或源于公司的合同义务,就免于对他们自己犯下的欺诈行为承担个人责任。有限责任公司的类似行为者也享有豁免权。这些法院并不要求商业实体本身对欺诈行为负责。当实体不承担责任时,即使陪审团发现欺诈行为,这些新的持股也使欺诈受害者根本得不到补救。一个(或两个)德州上诉法院的判决与此相反。德克萨斯州最高法院可能会对这个问题做出裁决,一名法官已经签署了协议。迄今为止,只有少数执业律师在书面文件中注意到这些裁决。没有评论员质疑过他们。但这些决定是错误的。这些法院声称遵循成文法,但成文法并不支持法院的分析。该法令的立法历史也是如此。令人惊讶的(可能是未被注意到的)结果强烈表明立法机关从未有意如此解读。有什么理由可以证明这一点呢?欺诈在经济上相当于盗窃。从业人员对判决的评论表明,提起欺诈诉讼的成本太高。德州亲商政策的名声可能暗示这一举动只是有益的放松管制,但事实并非如此。监管欺诈行为是确保市场对合同自由安全的唯一途径,对欺诈索赔提起诉讼是法院的职责。在这些决定成为德克萨斯州和其他地方的法律之前,应该放弃它们。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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