Regulation Through Substitution as Policy Tool: Swap Futurization Under Dodd-Frank

Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Jai R. Massari
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Recently, significant market and regulatory attention has focused on a new trend known as “futurization” — the recasting of economic arrangements previously transacted as swaps to trade as futures. This trend results from new regulations governing swap markets under the Dodd-Frank Act, which increase the cost of transacting in swaps. Given the magnitude of the business and economic interests at stake — the swaps market is estimated at $633 trillion and the futures market is estimated to be $24 trillion — the futurization trend has significant implications for the success of the Dodd-Frank Act’s swap market reforms and can provide important insights to regulatory agencies as they seek to protect financial markets in the post-financial crisis environment.This Article is the first to provide an academic treatment of this trend and its implications for regulatory policymaking. We develop a simple economic model to explain how regulators can “regulate through substitution” by encouraging market participants to subject themselves to one regulatory regime versus another through the imposition of differential regulatory costs. By applying this model to three critical areas of CFTC swap rulemaking — margin requirements, protection of customer collateral and public dissemination of swap trading data — we predict the futurization effects of these regulations, which are in some cases contrary to what might be expected or desired. In doing so, we demonstrate how the common view of futurization as a trend affecting the swap markets in a uniform manner is overly simplistic and obscures the important lessons of futurization.Armed with this predictive tool, we believe that the CFTC can apply the regulation through substitution analysis to design regulations better to achieve its policy goals and to assess the costs and benefits of proposed regulations. This same tool can be used by other regulators that similarly oversee multiple related regulatory regimes to better implement their policy concerns in similar contexts.
以替代为政策工具的监管:多德-弗兰克法案下的互换未来化
最近,市场和监管机构的注意力都集中在一种被称为“未来化”的新趋势上——将以前以掉期交易的经济安排重新塑造为以期货交易的经济安排。这一趋势源于《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)下管理掉期市场的新规定,这些规定增加了掉期交易的成本。考虑到商业和经济利益的重要性——掉期市场估计为633万亿美元,期货市场估计为24万亿美元——未来化趋势对多德-弗兰克法案的掉期市场改革的成功具有重要意义,并且可以为监管机构在后金融危机环境中寻求保护金融市场提供重要见解。本文首次对这一趋势及其对监管政策制定的影响进行了学术分析。我们开发了一个简单的经济模型来解释监管机构如何“通过替代进行监管”,即通过施加不同的监管成本,鼓励市场参与者接受一种监管制度,而不是另一种监管制度。通过将该模型应用于CFTC掉期规则制定的三个关键领域——保证金要求、客户抵押品保护和掉期交易数据的公开传播——我们预测了这些法规的未来影响,在某些情况下,这些影响可能与预期或期望的相反。在此过程中,我们证明了将未来化视为一种以统一方式影响掉期市场的趋势的共同观点是如何过于简单化,并模糊了未来化的重要教训。有了这一预测工具,我们相信CFTC可以通过替代分析来应用监管,更好地设计监管,以实现其政策目标,并评估拟议监管的成本和收益。其他监管机构也可以使用同样的工具来监督多个相关的监管制度,以便在类似的背景下更好地实施他们的政策关注点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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