{"title":"How to Fix Unreasonable Merger Regulation","authors":"Sheldon Kimmel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2663097","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The 1914 Clayton Act prohibited any acquisition whose effect may be to “substantially” lessen competition. International Shoe defined § 7’s word “substantially” by saying that an acquisition’s effect is “substantial” only if it “will injuriously affect the public.” This paper shows that Standard Stations agreed: International Shoe’s definition of the Act’s word “substantially” was the only definition that Standard Stations offered. Although Standard Stations found that Congress had “authoritatively determined” that § 3 was exceptional, it never disputed International Shoe’s definition, which remained the well-known meaning of § 7’s word “substantially” when Congress reenacted § 7 in 1950. Since the context of Congress’ action is consistent with International Shoe’s definition, Congress was “presumed” to have adopted it, producing a better policy than what has been proposed since later Courts misread that history.","PeriodicalId":345107,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Antitrust (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2663097","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The 1914 Clayton Act prohibited any acquisition whose effect may be to “substantially” lessen competition. International Shoe defined § 7’s word “substantially” by saying that an acquisition’s effect is “substantial” only if it “will injuriously affect the public.” This paper shows that Standard Stations agreed: International Shoe’s definition of the Act’s word “substantially” was the only definition that Standard Stations offered. Although Standard Stations found that Congress had “authoritatively determined” that § 3 was exceptional, it never disputed International Shoe’s definition, which remained the well-known meaning of § 7’s word “substantially” when Congress reenacted § 7 in 1950. Since the context of Congress’ action is consistent with International Shoe’s definition, Congress was “presumed” to have adopted it, producing a better policy than what has been proposed since later Courts misread that history.