{"title":"Resource allocation in cooperative networks: The role of games","authors":"G. Xue","doi":"10.1109/LCN.2011.6115153","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Summary form only given. Cooperative communication is becoming a promising technology to increase the channel capacity of wireless networks. The assignment of relay nodes to users plays a critical role to the resulting channel capacity. A significant challenge is how to make the assignment scheme robust to selfish and cheating behavior of users while guaranteeing the social optimal system capacity. In this keynote, we will present an integrated optimal relay assignment scheme for cooperative networks. To avoid system performance degradation due to selfish relay selections by the users, we propose a payment mechanism for charging the users to induce them to converge to the optimal assignment. To prevent relay nodes from manipulating the relay assignment by reporting transmission powers untruthfully, we propose a payment mechanism to pay them for providing relaying service.","PeriodicalId":437953,"journal":{"name":"2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2011 IEEE 36th Conference on Local Computer Networks","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LCN.2011.6115153","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Summary form only given. Cooperative communication is becoming a promising technology to increase the channel capacity of wireless networks. The assignment of relay nodes to users plays a critical role to the resulting channel capacity. A significant challenge is how to make the assignment scheme robust to selfish and cheating behavior of users while guaranteeing the social optimal system capacity. In this keynote, we will present an integrated optimal relay assignment scheme for cooperative networks. To avoid system performance degradation due to selfish relay selections by the users, we propose a payment mechanism for charging the users to induce them to converge to the optimal assignment. To prevent relay nodes from manipulating the relay assignment by reporting transmission powers untruthfully, we propose a payment mechanism to pay them for providing relaying service.