{"title":"A Semantic Framework for Direct Information Flows in Hybrid-Dynamic Systems","authors":"Sepehr Amir-Mohammadian","doi":"10.1145/3457339.3457981","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Hybrid-dynamic models provide an underlying framework to study the evergrowing cyber-physical systems with an emphasis on the integration of their discrete computational steps and the associated continuous physical dynamics. Ubiquity of cyber-physical systems necessitates some level of assurance about the secure flow of information through different discrete and continuous components. In recent years, different logical frameworks have been proposed to analyze indirect information flows in cyber-physical systems. While these frameworks are used to verify secure flow of information in a metalevel, they naturally fall short in support of implementing information flow analyzers that could effectively enforce policies at runtime. This practical limitation has triggered the implementation of direct information flow analyzers in different language settings. In this paper, we focus on direct flows of information confidentiality in hybrid-dynamic environments and propose a semantic framework through which we can judge about such flows. This semantic framework can be used to study the correctness of enforced policies by these analyzers, and in particular taint tracking tools. In this regard, we specify a dynamic taint tracking policy for hybrid dynamic systems and prove its soundness based on the proposed semantic framework. As a case study, we consider the flow of information in a public transportation control system, and the effectiveness of our enforced policy on this system.","PeriodicalId":239758,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 7th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 7th ACM on Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3457339.3457981","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Hybrid-dynamic models provide an underlying framework to study the evergrowing cyber-physical systems with an emphasis on the integration of their discrete computational steps and the associated continuous physical dynamics. Ubiquity of cyber-physical systems necessitates some level of assurance about the secure flow of information through different discrete and continuous components. In recent years, different logical frameworks have been proposed to analyze indirect information flows in cyber-physical systems. While these frameworks are used to verify secure flow of information in a metalevel, they naturally fall short in support of implementing information flow analyzers that could effectively enforce policies at runtime. This practical limitation has triggered the implementation of direct information flow analyzers in different language settings. In this paper, we focus on direct flows of information confidentiality in hybrid-dynamic environments and propose a semantic framework through which we can judge about such flows. This semantic framework can be used to study the correctness of enforced policies by these analyzers, and in particular taint tracking tools. In this regard, we specify a dynamic taint tracking policy for hybrid dynamic systems and prove its soundness based on the proposed semantic framework. As a case study, we consider the flow of information in a public transportation control system, and the effectiveness of our enforced policy on this system.