Cross Subsidy in Loss Allocation in Power Distribution Network Based on Game Theory Approach

Abstract

The loss occurring in a power distribution network is allocated to the users to recover it. The allocation of losses should be fair, transparent and consider users’ contributions to losses. It should also be free from cross subsidy, i.e., any user should not be subsidized over others. It necessitates a mechanism to identify and quantity cross subsidy in the results of loss allocation. This paper, therefore, investigates the cross subsidy by modeling the distribution network as a cooperative game. The coalition of loads and distributed generators is separately modeled as a surplus game and cost game. In surplus and cost games, a subsidy-free allocation lies within the core, and the deviation from the subsidy-free solution is utilized to determine the level of cross-subsidization. The proposed method is applied to the results of various loss allocation methods such as prorata, branch current decomposition method, Shapley value-based method, and $\tau-$value based method for cross subsidy evaluation. The results are tested in three different test systems, and the findings are analyzed and discussed in this paper.