Financing a Quality-uncertain Supplier under Procurement Decentralization

Zhiping Lin, Di Xu, R. Shi, G. Cai
{"title":"Financing a Quality-uncertain Supplier under Procurement Decentralization","authors":"Zhiping Lin, Di Xu, R. Shi, G. Cai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3714217","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: This article investigates the optimal combination of financing schemes (bank finance versus buyer finance) and outsourcing structures (consignment versus turnkey) in a three-tier supply chain composed of a capital-constrained quality-uncertain component supplier (SP), a contract manufacturer (CM), and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).<br><br>Academic/Practical relevance: In outsourcing practice, the OEM must decide on whether to procure components directly from the SP (i.e., consignment) or decentralize the component procurement to the CM (i.e., turnkey). However, no paper has yet studied firms’ preferences of all these four combinations of financing schemes and outsourcing structures.<br><br>Methodology: To address the above concern, we apply a Stackelberg game setting to characterize the equilibrium product quality, contract prices, interest rates, and firms’ profits.<br><br>Results: Our analysis reveals that buyer finance can conditionally outperform bank finance under both consignment and turnkey; however, the benefit of buyer finance is more significantly undercut by the procurement decentralization. Furthermore, the capital-constrained SP may encounter a collateral dilemma under turnkey, in which the SP suffers from possessing a higher asset value. Notwithstanding, firms can benefit from procurement decentralization in both bank finance and buyer finance when the CM’s capital cost is low enough. Such benefit is more significant in bank finance; thus, it is more likely for the OEM to select turnkey over consignment in bank finance than in buyer finance, but at the expense of other firms.<br><br>Managerial implications: This study provides some guidelines for OEMs when making their outsourcing and financing decisions. Managers should be aware of that financing schemes and outsourcing structures are not independent of each other, and procurement decentralization should be implemented with consideration of firms’ financial and operational interaction.","PeriodicalId":330590,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Procurement (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3714217","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Problem definition: This article investigates the optimal combination of financing schemes (bank finance versus buyer finance) and outsourcing structures (consignment versus turnkey) in a three-tier supply chain composed of a capital-constrained quality-uncertain component supplier (SP), a contract manufacturer (CM), and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM).

Academic/Practical relevance: In outsourcing practice, the OEM must decide on whether to procure components directly from the SP (i.e., consignment) or decentralize the component procurement to the CM (i.e., turnkey). However, no paper has yet studied firms’ preferences of all these four combinations of financing schemes and outsourcing structures.

Methodology: To address the above concern, we apply a Stackelberg game setting to characterize the equilibrium product quality, contract prices, interest rates, and firms’ profits.

Results: Our analysis reveals that buyer finance can conditionally outperform bank finance under both consignment and turnkey; however, the benefit of buyer finance is more significantly undercut by the procurement decentralization. Furthermore, the capital-constrained SP may encounter a collateral dilemma under turnkey, in which the SP suffers from possessing a higher asset value. Notwithstanding, firms can benefit from procurement decentralization in both bank finance and buyer finance when the CM’s capital cost is low enough. Such benefit is more significant in bank finance; thus, it is more likely for the OEM to select turnkey over consignment in bank finance than in buyer finance, but at the expense of other firms.

Managerial implications: This study provides some guidelines for OEMs when making their outsourcing and financing decisions. Managers should be aware of that financing schemes and outsourcing structures are not independent of each other, and procurement decentralization should be implemented with consideration of firms’ financial and operational interaction.
采购分权下质量不确定供应商融资
问题定义:本文研究了由资本受限、质量不确定的组件供应商(SP)、合同制造商(CM)和原始设备制造商(OEM)组成的三层供应链中融资方案(银行融资vs买方融资)和外包结构(寄售vs交钥匙)的最佳组合。学术/实践相关性:在外包实践中,OEM必须决定是直接从SP处采购组件(即寄售),还是将组件采购分散到CM处(即交钥匙)。然而,目前还没有论文研究企业对这四种融资方案和外包结构组合的偏好。方法:为了解决上述问题,我们应用Stackelberg博弈设置来描述均衡产品质量、合同价格、利率和企业利润。结果:买方融资在寄售和交钥匙模式下均有条件优于银行融资;然而,采购权力下放更严重地削弱了买方融资的好处。此外,资金受限的SP可能会遇到交钥匙下的抵押品困境,即SP拥有更高的资产价值。然而,当CM的资金成本足够低时,企业可以从银行融资和买方融资的采购分散化中获益。这种效益在银行融资中更为显著;因此,在银行融资中,OEM比在买方融资中更有可能选择交钥匙而不是委托,但这是以其他公司的利益为代价的。管理启示:本研究为oem厂商进行外包和融资决策提供了一些指导。管理人员应当意识到,筹资计划和外包结构不是相互独立的,采购权力下放的执行应当考虑到公司的财务和业务相互作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信