Transparency in Corporate Groups

J. L. Westbrook
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This Article addresses a remarkable blind spot in American law: the failure to apply the well-established principles of secured credit to prevent inefficiency, confusion, and fraud in the manipulation of the webs of subsidiaries within corporate groups. In particular, “asset partitioning” has been a fashionable subject in which the central problem of non-transparency has been often mentioned, but little addressed. This Article offers a concept for a new system of corporate disclosure for the benefit of creditors and other stakeholders. It would require disclosure of corporate structures and allocations of assets among affiliates to the extent the affiliates are to be treated as independent legal entities. Enforcement would follow the secured creditor model: the failure to follow the rules would lead to disregard of corporate independence. Modern secured credit law is subject to many criticisms, but the emerging versions of credit security transparency found around the world have increased both efficiency and fairness in commercial transactions. Its example suggests the basis for reforms to achieve an analogous result for the extension of credit to groups of corporations, especially in international finance where partitioning is often used in lieu of secured financing. The long-term objective is to create a body of scholarship examining this problem and to propose a regime of corporate responsibility and transparency to correct it.
企业集团的透明度
本文解决了美国法律中一个显著的盲点:未能应用公认的担保信贷原则来防止企业集团内部子公司网络操纵中的效率低下、混乱和欺诈。特别是,“资产分割”一直是一个时髦的话题,其中不透明的核心问题经常被提及,但很少得到解决。本文提出了一种新的公司信息披露制度的概念,以使债权人和其他利益相关者受益。它将要求披露公司结构和关联公司之间的资产分配情况,以使关联公司被视为独立的法律实体。执行将遵循有担保债权人模式:不遵守规则将导致无视公司独立性。现代担保信贷法受到许多批评,但在世界各地发现的信用安全透明度的新版本提高了商业交易的效率和公平性。它的例子表明了改革的基础,以便在向公司集团提供信贷方面取得类似的结果,特别是在经常使用分割代替担保融资的国际金融领域。长期目标是建立一个研究这一问题的学术机构,并提出一种企业责任和透明度制度,以纠正这一问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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