Equality of opportunity

Abstract

Chapter 4 scrutinizes justifications appealing to equality of opportunity. Initially, it defines “opportunity” and then proceeds to distinguish between formal and substantive equality of opportunity. It shows why, contrary to common beliefs, on some interpretations formal equality of opportunity is compatible with, indeed requires, affirmative action. Also, on those interpretations of formal equality of opportunity where it rules out affirmative action, formal equality of opportunity does not constitute a plausible fundamental requirement of justice. The chapter also argues that affirmative action generally promotes substantive equality of opportunity across individuals; that substantive equality of opportunity can be rooted in distributive fairness and the relational concern that we all relate to one another in a fair way; and, finally, that a number of common challenges to substantive equality of opportunity can either be defeated or will in themselves motivate closely related justifications of a wide set of affirmative action policies.