Stochastic Pricing Game for Aggregated Demand Response Considering Comfort Level

Yang Chen, Kadir Amasyali, Byungkwon Park, M. Olama, B. Telsang, S. Djouadi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In recent years, demand response (DR) has been explored as a fundamental strategy for demand-side management due to its advantages in mediating intermittency of renewable energy generation, load shifting, etc. To engage customers in DR programs, several deterministic price-based DR strategies have been developed and implemented. However, the stochastic weather conditions and occupants' consumption behaviors often make the deterministic solution less robust to uncertainties. In this paper, with the consideration of the uncertainties, a stochastic Stackelberg game is proposed to model the price-demand negotiation between a distributed system operator and load aggregators, where the virtual battery constraints are extracted from the building thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs)‘ characteristics to guarantee comfortable TCLs' levels. Following the negotiation, a priority-based control method is used to allocate the optimal aggregated power DR profile at the building level and track the power signal. Several groups of experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the stochastic solutions.
考虑舒适度的总需求响应随机定价对策
近年来,需求响应(DR)由于其在调节可再生能源发电的间歇性、负荷转移等方面的优势,已被探索作为需求侧管理的基本策略。为了让客户参与到DR计划中来,已经开发并实施了几种基于价格的确定性DR策略。然而,随机天气条件和居住者的消费行为往往使确定性解对不确定性的鲁棒性降低。本文在考虑不确定性的情况下,提出了一种随机Stackelberg博弈模型来模拟分布式系统运营商与负荷集合器之间的价格-需求协商,其中从建筑物恒温控制负荷(tcl)特性中提取虚拟电池约束以保证tcl的舒适水平。在协商后,采用基于优先级的控制方法分配建筑物级最优的聚合功率容灾轮廓,并跟踪功率信号。几组实验证明了随机解的有效性和鲁棒性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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