A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks

Richard T. B. Ma, Sam C. M. Lee, John C.S. Lui, David K. Y. Yau
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引用次数: 137

Abstract

Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can obtain services without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the "free-riding" and "tragedy of the commons" problems, in which the majority of information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P nodes willing to share their resources. The objective of this work is to enable service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each node has provided to its community, thereby encouraging all network nodes to share resources. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism between all information sharing nodes. The mechanism is driven by a distributed algorithm which has linear time complexity and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allocation. Besides giving incentive, the mechanism distributes resources in a way that increases the aggregate utility of the whole network. Second, we model the whole resource request and distribution process as a competition game between the competing nodes. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium and is collusion-proof. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which all competing nodes interact with the information providing node to reach Nash equilibrium in a dynamic and efficient manner. Experimental results are reported to illustrate that the protocol achieves its service differentiation objective and can induce productive information sharing by rational network nodes. Finally, we show that our protocol can properly adapt to different node arrival and departure events, and to different forms of network congestion.
P2P网络中提供激励和服务差异化的博弈论方法
传统的点对点(P2P)网络没有为用户提供服务差异化和激励。因此,用户无需向P2P社区提供任何信息或服务即可获得服务。这就导致了“搭便车”和“公地悲剧”的问题,在这种情况下,大多数信息请求都指向少数愿意共享资源的P2P节点。这项工作的目标是基于每个节点向其社区提供的服务量,在P2P网络中实现服务差异化,从而鼓励所有网络节点共享资源。首先介绍了信息共享节点间的资源分配机制。该机制由具有线性时间复杂度的分布式算法驱动,保证了资源的帕累托最优分配。除了给予激励外,该机制还以提高整个网络的总效用的方式来分配资源。其次,我们将整个资源请求和分配过程建模为竞争节点之间的竞争博弈。我们证明了这个博弈具有纳什均衡并且是防合谋的。为了实现这种博弈,我们提出了一种协议,在该协议中,所有竞争节点与信息提供节点相互作用,以动态有效的方式达到纳什均衡。实验结果表明,该协议实现了服务差异化目标,并能诱导合理的网络节点进行有效的信息共享。最后,我们证明了我们的协议可以很好地适应不同的节点到达和离开事件,以及不同形式的网络拥塞。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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