RamCrypt: Kernel-based Address Space Encryption for User-mode Processes

J. Götzfried, Tilo Müller, Gabor Drescher, S. Nürnberger, M. Backes
{"title":"RamCrypt: Kernel-based Address Space Encryption for User-mode Processes","authors":"J. Götzfried, Tilo Müller, Gabor Drescher, S. Nürnberger, M. Backes","doi":"10.1145/2897845.2897924","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We present RamCrypt, a solution that allows unmodified Linux processes to transparently work on encrypted data. RamCrypt can be deployed and enabled on a per-process basis without recompiling user-mode applications. In every enabled process, data is only stored in cleartext for the moment it is processed, and otherwise stays encrypted in RAM. In particular, the required encryption keys do not reside in RAM, but are stored in CPU registers only. Hence, RamCrypt effectively thwarts memory disclosure attacks, which grant unauthorized access to process memory, as well as physical attacks such as cold boot and DMA attacks. In its default configuration, RamCrypt exposes only up to 4 memory pages in cleartext at the same time. For the nginx web server serving encrypted HTTPS pages under heavy load, the necessary TLS secret key is hidden for 97% of its time.","PeriodicalId":166633,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"72 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"28","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897924","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28

Abstract

We present RamCrypt, a solution that allows unmodified Linux processes to transparently work on encrypted data. RamCrypt can be deployed and enabled on a per-process basis without recompiling user-mode applications. In every enabled process, data is only stored in cleartext for the moment it is processed, and otherwise stays encrypted in RAM. In particular, the required encryption keys do not reside in RAM, but are stored in CPU registers only. Hence, RamCrypt effectively thwarts memory disclosure attacks, which grant unauthorized access to process memory, as well as physical attacks such as cold boot and DMA attacks. In its default configuration, RamCrypt exposes only up to 4 memory pages in cleartext at the same time. For the nginx web server serving encrypted HTTPS pages under heavy load, the necessary TLS secret key is hidden for 97% of its time.
RamCrypt:基于内核的用户模式进程地址空间加密
我们介绍RamCrypt,一个允许未经修改的Linux进程透明地处理加密数据的解决方案。RamCrypt可以在每个进程的基础上部署和启用,而无需重新编译用户模式应用程序。在每个启用的进程中,数据仅在处理时以明文形式存储,否则在RAM中保持加密。特别是,所需的加密密钥不驻留在RAM中,而仅存储在CPU寄存器中。因此,RamCrypt有效地阻止了内存泄露攻击,这种攻击允许对进程内存进行未经授权的访问,以及物理攻击,如冷启动和DMA攻击。在其默认配置中,RamCrypt同时以明文形式暴露最多4个内存页。对于nginx web服务器在高负载下提供加密的HTTPS页面,必要的TLS密钥在97%的时间内是隐藏的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信